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INTRODUCTION
The year 1994 was a modestly productive, if not momentous, year
for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the Government
contracts area. The Federal Circuit issued twenty-two precedential
decisions concerning Government contracts in 1994, compared to
forty decisions in 1993,1 thirty-one decisions in 19922 and twenty-six
decisions in 1991.' While no single 1994 decision was a precedential
bombshell, collectively these twenty-two precedential decisions covered
a wide variety of Government contracts issues and will contribute to
1. See Richard B. Clifford, Jr. et al., Government Contract Cases Before the Court of Appealsfor
the Federal Circui 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (1994) (mentioning number of important cases
in 1993).
2. See VictorJ. Zupa & BrianJ. Siebel, Government Contracts: 1992 Analysis and Summary,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1993) (counting number of 1992 decisions).
3. SeeLynda Troutman O'Sullivan & Martin P. Willard, Government Contracts: 1991 Analysis
and Summary, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 911, 912 (1992) (counting 1991 decisions).
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the body of modem federal Government contracts law. Fortunately,
more of the court's attention in 1994 was devoted to issues of
substance, and less to fine points ofjurisdiction and procedure, than
in some past years.
Half of the Federal Circuit's twenty-two precedential Government
contracts decisions during 1994 came to the court from the United
States Court of Federal Claims4 and half came from one of three
boards of contract appeals.5 In fourteen cases, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision below;6 in six cases it reversed or vacated;7 and
in two cases it affirmed in part and reversed in part.s The Govern-
ment fared considerably better in 1994 than did private parties,
prevailing in fourteen cases,9 losing in seven cases,"° and splitting
the difference in one case.'
A reasonable degree of harmony prevailed at the Federal Circuit in
its Government contracts decisions during 1994. Seventeen of the
twenty-two precedential decisions drew no dissenting opinion at all.
4. SeeA-Transport Northwest Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Parcel 490
Ltd. Partnership v. United States, 31 F.3d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1994); City of Tacoma v. United States,
31 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Wilner v. United States, 24 F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Bank of
Am. v. United States, 23 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Bath Iron Works, Corp. v. United States, 20
F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d. 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Young-Montenay, Inc.
v. United States, 15 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
5. Se. Cleveland Telecommunications Corp. v. Goldin, 43 F.3d 655 (Fed. Cir. 1994); West
Coast Gen. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Reflectone, Inc. v. Kelso, 34 F.3d 1031 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, 31 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Interwest Constr. v. Brown,
29 F.3d 611 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton, 25 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
General Motors Corp. v. Aspin, 24 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. Kelso, 19
F.3d 39 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. Goldin, 16 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Kelso
v. Kirk Bros. Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 16 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Grumman Data Sys.
Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Kimbrell v. Fischer, 15 F.3d 175 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
6. See Cleveland Teleommunications, 43 F.3d at 655; Bonneville Assocs. v. United States, 43
F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hercules Painting Co. v. Widnall, 40 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1994); West
Coast Gen. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312 (Fed. Cir. 1994); A-Transpor4 36 F.3d at 1576; City of Tacoma,
31 F.3d at 1130; Intenoest Construction, 29 F.3d at 611; Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Bath Iron Works, 20 F.3d at 1567; Dairyland Power, 16 F.3d at 1197; Grumman
Data Systems, 15 F.3d at 1044; Kirnbre 15 F.3d at 175; Young-Montenay, 15 F.3d at 1040; Wklkham,
12 F.3d at 1574.
7. See Bianchi, 31 F.3d at 1163; Diamond, 25 F.3d at 1006; Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1397; General
Motors, 24 F.3d at 1376; Bank of America, 23 F.3d at 380; SterlingFederal, 16 F.3d at 1177.
8. See Hoskins, 20 F.3d. at 1144; Kirk Brothers, 16 F.3d at 1173.
9. See Cleveland Telecommunications, 43 F.3d at 655; Bonneville Associates, 43 F.3d at 649;
Herues Painting, 40 F.3d at 1230; West Coast Gen., 39 F.3d at 312; A-Transpor, 36 F.3d at 1576;
Bianch4 31 F.3d at 1163; General Motors, 24 F.3d at 1376; Hercules, 24 F.3d at 188; Hoskins, 20
F.3d. at 1144; Dairyland Power, 16 F.3d at 1197; Kirk Brothers, 16 F.3d at 1173; Grumman Data
Systems, 15 F.3d at 1044; Young-Montenay, 15 F.3d at 1040; Kimbrell 15 F.3d at 175; Wickham, 12
F.3d at 1574.
10. See Parcel 49C, 31 F.3d at 1147; Interwest Construction, 29 F.3d at 611; Diamond, 25 F.3d at
1006; Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1397; Bank of Amerca, 23 F.3d at 380; Bath Iron Works, 20 F.3d. at 1567;
Sterling Federal, 16 F.3d at 1177.
11. See City of Tacoma, 31 F.3d at 1130.
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Of the five cases decided by a divided court, four cases were decided
by two-to-one margins. 12  The court's single en banc decision this
year, which reversed a precedent of almost thirty years' standing, drew
two dissents.'" Judge Newman found herself to be an independent
thinker on Government contracts topics more often than any other
judge on the Federal Circuit; she filed dissenting opinions in four
cases decided during 1994."4
Part I of this Article examines seven decisions that addressed issues
of contract formation. Part II analyzes eight cases that posed issues
of interpretation, performance or contract administration (one of
these cases overlaps with issues discussed in Part I). Part III discusses
two opinions that concern contract breach and termination, and Part
IV addresses six decisions that concern procedural issues that arise in
the dispute resolution procedures that are unique to the context of
government contracting.
I. CONTRACT FORMATION
A. Government's Duty to Conduct a Fair Procurement
Since the Court of Claims' decision in Heyer Products Co. v. United
States,'5 the courts have recognized that the Government owes a legal
duty to prospective contractors to conduct a fair procurement. 6 By
issuing a solicitation and inviting bidders to invest their time and
money in preparing bids, the Government implicitly promises that it
will honestly, fairly, and impartially consider each bid.'7 Subsequent
court decisions have reaffirmed and applied the holding of Heyer
Products in a variety of contexts. Even in the face of the judicial
presumption that government officials properly perform their official
12. See Hercules Painting, 40 F.3d at 1230; West Coast Genera4 39 F.d at 312; Interwest
Construction, 29 F.3d at 611; Hercules; 24 F.3d at 188; Hoskins, 20 F.d. at 1144.
13. See Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1397.
14. See West Coast Genera 39 F.3d at 312; Interwest Construction, 29 F.3d at 611; 1ilner, 24 F.d
at 1397; Hoskins, 20 F.3d. at 1144.
15. 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
16. See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 413 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (stating that
prospective contractor has right to have bid honestly reviewed).
17. See id& (holding that Government has obligation to consider honestly and fairly all bids
because of costs incurred by prospective contractors in bid preparation). In the end, Heyer lost
its case, because it could not prove that the Government had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
in bad faith. See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 251, 252 (Ct. Cl. 1959). The
Court of Claims found that the Government's rejection of Heyer's bid did not reflect an
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable act because the bid did not comply with the specifications
in the solicitation. Id. at 253-57.
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duties, courts have sometimes held that the Government breached its
duty to conduct a fair procurement.1
8
In Parcel 49C Limited Partnership v. United States,19 the Federal
Circuit held that the Government's pretextual cancellation of a
solicitation violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement.20 The
solicitation, issued by the General Services Administration (GSA),
sought building space for relocating the headquarters of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).21 The solicitation set forth the
FCC's needs as to square footage, occupancy dates, and geographical
areas.22 At the time, the FCC was located in a "fashionable district"
of northwest Washington, D.C.23 During the course of the procure-
ment, the FCC asked the GSA to cancel the solicitation and to restrict
the geographical area, thereby excluding "the less desirable southwest
quadrant of Washington, D.C."24 where Parcel 49C's site was locat-
ed . ' The FCC stated that it preferred to remain close to the offices
of communications industry representatives. 26  The GSA refused to
revise the solicitation.27
The FCC did not give up. It tried, without success, to persuade the
GSA to award the contract to another offeror, even though the
offeror's rent exceeded the authorized ceiling and its square footage
18. See Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d 905, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that Government's rejection of all bids after completing live auction for sale of timber was
arbitrary and capricious). The United States Forest Service overestimated the number of trees
available and therefore sought to reject all bids and resolicit new bids for the correct number
of trees. Id. at 908. The Federal Circuit held that the Forest Service's rejection of all bids,
resulting ftom its own error concerning the number of trees, constituted an abuse of discretion,
as well as an unreasonable and capricious act. Id. at 911-15; see also Keco Indus. v. United States,
428 F.2d 1233, 1239 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (denying Government's motion for summary judgment
because Government allegedly had actual or constructive knowledge that successful bidder's air
conditioning units would not work). Because the successful bidder's model would not work, the
Government would, by accepting this bid, eventually have to pay more than the original contract
price to receive a workable model. Id. at 1239-40. The Court of Claims reasoned that this
constituted an arbitrary and capricious action because the Government should have rejected this
faulty bid as unresponsive because it did not comply with the specifications in the solicitation.
Id. Like Heyer, Keco ultimately lost its case for failure of proof because it failed to establish that
the Government actually knew that the competitor's model was unworkable. Keco Indus. v.
United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1202 (Ct Cl. 1974).
19. 31 F.3d 1147 (Fed. Cir.), affg in pan and modiing in part, 39 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH)
76,689, at 89,357 (Ct Fed. Cl. 1994).
20. See Parcel 49C Ltd. Partnership v. United States, 31 F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(upholding Court of Federal Claims' determination that Government lacked valid reasons for
cancellation of contract and therefore breached its duty to conduct fair procurements).
21. Id. at 1148.
22. Id. at 1148-49.
23. Id. at 1149.
24. Id. at 1153.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1149.
27. Id.
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barely met the FCC's stated needs.2' After the FCC learned that the
GSA had selected Parcel 49C's offer, the "FCC responded with a
campaign to scuttle the procurement. "29 To this end, the FCC
conceded error in a pending Government Accounting Office (GAO)
protest, which had challenged the solicitation's mandatory occupancy
dates.3" One week later, the FCC formally advised the GSA that its
space requirements had increased, and on that basis the GSA
canceled the solicitation."
Parcel 49C challenged the GSA's action in the Court of Federal
Claims.12 After a bench trial, the court found that the GSA's stated
reason for canceling the solicitation was merely a pretext for allowing
the FCC to scuttle the selected site 3 at Parcel 49C. The trial court
held that the GSA abused its discretion in canceling the solicitation"
and enjoined the GSA to complete the procurement in accordance
with the solicitation.3 5
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Government's
arguments were mere "attempts to preserve its ill-gotten gain." 6 The
Federal Circuit found that the record amply supported the lower
court's conclusion that the GSA's "pretextual and incredible"37
justifications for canceling the procurement violated the notions of
fair procurement.' The Federal Circuit determined that, not only
did the Government lack a valid reason to cancel the procurement,3 9
but also the solicitation's cancellation was permeated with illegality."0
The GSA and other government officials did not have discretionary
power to yield to the FCC's pressure.4' Under the circumstances of
28. It Warner Theater Associates' offer to rent the Warner Building, located on
Pennsylvania Avenue, comprised the other bid in the solicitation. I& at 1149. The FCC desired
the Warner Building over the building space offered by Parcel 49C because of the Warner
Building's location in northwest Washington, D.C., but the space in the Warner Building barely
met the FCC's requirements. Id.
29. I.
30. Id An offeror whose bid was rejected as nonresponsive instigated the protest because
it contended that the date for occupancy constituted too restrictive a solicitation. Id. Upon
hearing of the award of the contract to Parcel 49C, the FCC only conceded that the solicitation
requiring such urgent occupancy dates was indeed too restrictive. Id.
31. it
32. Id
33. M at 1151.
34. I& at 1150-51.
35. It at 1149.
36. I at 1153.
37. I at 1151.
38. lt
39. It
40. See id. at 1153 (declaring that procurement law does not allow administrative officials'
personal predilections" to affect process).
41. M at 1153-54.
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this case, the Federal Circuit agreed that the Government's actions
constituted arbitrary and capricious action, and, therefore, violated its
implied contractual duty to conduct a fair procurement.42 The
Federal Circuit preferred injunctive relief, rather than resolicitation,
as the appropriate remedy.4'
Parcel 49C unequivocally reaffirms the Government's duty to
consider all bids fairly and honestly. In an era when the costs of
responding to a federal solicitation are soaring, and some disillu-
sioned contractors are abandoning the federal marketplace altogeth-
er, this decision is timely in restating the requirement that the
Government must conduct its procurements fairly."
Parcel 49C also fills a needed gap in the case law concerning the
cancellation of solicitations.' Such a cancellation can be a manipu-
lative tool when in the hands of a result-oriented contracting officer,
and the limited "reasonableness" review afforded by the GAO seldom
permits the fairness of the cancellation to be considered.46 The
Federal Circuit's opinion is also noteworthy in demonstrating a lack
of patience for legal arguments that attempt to justify a result that
simply does not pass the court's "smell test." Only time will tell
whether the GAO applies the Parcel 49C holding with the same vigor
with which the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
decided the case.
B. Contractual Validity--Offer and Acceptance
The essence of a common law contract is "a bargain in which there
is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consider-
ation."47 The bargain normally manifests itself in an "offer"' and
42. lId at 1153.
43. Id. Neither the Court of Federal Claims nor the Federal Circuit ordered that the
contract be awarded to Parcel 49G, even though the GSA had selected that bidder. The Federal
Circuit ordered injunctive relief in an attempt to restore this solicitation and contract award to
the realm of a lawful proceeding. XL The Federal Circuit believed that resolicitation would not
accomplish its goals of providing a fair system of acquisition and would amount to nothing more
than an admonishment of the FCC's and the GSA's behavior. Id. at 1154. The court viewed the
injunction as a tool to remove all traces of illegality surrounding the solicitation without
interfering with the process of bid selection. Id
44. SeeJohn Cibinic, Cancellaiion of Soliitations: Are Bids and PNposals Sweeter the Second Time
Around?, 7 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 36, at 102 (1993) (stating that cancellation and resolicitation
should be used cautiously, mindful of time and expense concerns).
45. See generally iU. at 98-102 (describing and distinguishing mandatory and discretionary
standards for cancellation of solicitations set out in regulations).
46. SeeAnvan Realty & Management Co., Comp. Gen. B-214295, 84-1 CPD 1 548 (1984)
(dismissing protest against geographical gerrymandering by GSA as "academic" once GSA
canceled solicitation).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
48. See id. § 24 (defining "offer" as clearly demonstrated intent to enter into bargain).
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an "acceptance."49  In government contracting under the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR),5" the process of offer and acceptance
usually involves (1) the Government's issuance of an invitation for
bids or a request for proposals; (2) the contractor's making a bid or
a proposal; and (3) the Government's acceptance by issuing a formal
notice of award. 1 Because some government procurements do not
fit this model, such as certain contracts for transportation services, the
FAR does not always apply. 2 In these situations, the Government
solicits an offer or "tender" of services from a carrier and, during the
term of that tender, issues a Government Bill of Lading (GBL) for the
services required." In some instances, the GBL constitutes the
contract,' while in other situations, the courts find that contract
formation occurred at some earlier point in the parties' dealings.55
In A-Transport Northwest Co. v. United States,5" the Federal Circuit
held that a tender agreement executed by a carrier constituted a
binding "conventional requirements contract" between the parties.7
The Government's solicitation sought tenders from Seattle-based
trucking firms to transport perishable goods to government installa-
tions in the Pacific Northwest during a twenty-four-month period.5
49. See id. § 50 (defining "acceptance" as either intent or action that demonstrates to other
party intent to accept terms of offer).
50. See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (1994). The FAR
System attempts to establish uniform procedures of acquisition throughout federal agencies.
This system consists of the FAR, the central document that sets out the regulations regarding
acquisitions, and supplemental regulations of the individual agencies. RALPH C. NASH, JR. &
STEVEN L. SCHOONER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOoK 172-73 (1992)
[hereinafter NASH & SCHOONER].
51. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 14.201 to .408-2, 15.400 to .416, 15.600 to .613, 15.1002 (1994)
(advancing regulations concerning solicitation of bids, negotiations in procurement, and source
selection).
52. See id. § 47.200(b) (2)-(3) (stating that usual system of acquisition does not apply to
freight transportation requiring bills of lading).
53. See id. §§ 47.200 to .207-9 (setting out regulations of transportation contracts).
54. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336,342 (1982)
(stating that transportation contract consisted of bill of lading and that terms of bill bound all
parties involved); Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 263, 271 (1991) (declaring that
terms of parties' contractual relationship, as between carrier and shipper, consisted of tender
and tariff representing offer and GBL representing acceptance), af'd, 969 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir.
1992); C & H Transp. Co. v. United States, 436 F.2d 480 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (holding that shipper's
tenders constituted continuing offers to Government and therefore became binding on
Government's acceptance).
55. SeePortArthur Towing Co., ASBCANo. 37516,89-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 22,004, at 110,629-
30 (1989) (jurisdictional decision) (noting that GBLs represent part of payment scheme of
contract), appeal denied, 90-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 22,857, at 114,822 (1990) (merits decision); In re
Federal Transp., Inc. 68 Comp. Gen. 451, B-233393.3, 89-1 CPD 1 542 (1989) (declaring that
rate tenders represent offers to perform transportation).
56. 36 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff'g27 Cl. Ct. 206 (1992).
57. SeeA-Transport Northwest Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
58. Id. at 1577.
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The solicitation included a formal Tender Agreement to be executed
by firms that submitted a tender. 9
A-Transport submitted its tender together with an executed copy of
the Tender Agreement.' ° The Government selected A-Transport as
the primary carrier for twenty-three routes and notified the firm of its
acceptance of the tender for those routes.6" Thereafter, the Govern-
ment and A-Transport executed a no-cost modification of the Tender
Agreement to revise loading and delivery schedules.62 When the
Government tried to obtain a second no-cost modification, A-
Transport refused.68 The Government decided to revoke the tenders
it had awarded, resolicit its requirements, and award new tenders for
the balance of the original two-year period.'
After A-Transport received five fewer routes than it had received
from the original Government tender, it submitted a claim for lost
profits, alleging that the Government's resolicitation breached the
Tender Agreement.65 A-Transport also alleged that the Govern-
ment's actions reflected a bad faith attempt to eliminate A-Transport
as a government contractor.' When the Government refused to
grant the claim, A-Transport sued in the Court of Federal Claims,
challenging the Government's right to resolicit tenders without
breaching the contracts previously awarded. 7 The Government
argued, among other things, that the Tender Agreement did not
constitute an enforceable contract, and that the Government was
contractually bound if, and only to the extent that, it issued GBLs.'
On cross-motions for summaryjudgment, the Court of Federal Claims
found that the Tender Agreement constituted a binding contract, but
found no breach by the Government 69
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' grant of
summary judgment to the Government.7 In doing so, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the lower court's analysis, holding that the Tender
59. d.
60. Id.
61. d. at 1578.
62. d.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1579.
67. Id. at 1578.
68. See. U at 1581 (explaining that Government viewed Tender Agreement as continuing
offer and not contract).
69. See id. at 1584 (holding that Government did not breach contract because terms allowed
modification when Government's requirements were altered).
70. Id. at 1585.
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Agreement constituted a binding contract between the parties.71
The Government argued that the Tender Agreement was merely a
continuing offer by A-Transport to perform services on the stated
terms, and that the carrier's offer was only accepted when the
Government issued a GBL. 2 The Government further argued
against finding that the Tender Agreement was a contract by asserting
that the process of establishing and enforcing the Tender Agreement
did not reflect FAR-like procedures because the Tender Agreement
lacked many of the traditional indicia of government contracting, as
well as any obligation on the part of the Government. 7
The Federal Circuit, "[o]n the facts of this case,"74 disagreed with
the Government's argument, viewing the solicitation as a clear
invitation for the carrier to bid.75 Upon receipt of the carrier's
tender, the Government had the power to create a contract by
accepting A-Transport's offer.7 The Government accepted that
offer by informing the carriers of their specific routes and installa-
tions.7  The court found that these actions by the Government
formed a binding contract.7
The Federal Circuit rejected the Government's argument that the
conventional trappings of Government contracting were lacking:
For one thing, the procurement was accomplished through formal
procedures not unlike those of FAR. For another, the dispositive
issue is whether there was an "offer" and an "acceptance," i.e., a
meeting of the minds from an objective standpoint, supported by
mutuality of consideration... not whether every conceivable detail
had been spelled out in the contract.'
The court also found a mutuality of consideration because the
contract, which was a conventional requirements contract, provided
adequate consideration in the Government's obligation to use the
carrier on an exclusive basis for the routes in question."' The fact
that the Government had not issued GBLs did not mean that a
predecessor document, such as the Tender Agreement, could not
71. Id. at 1581.
72. Id.
73. Id. (highlighting Government's arguments on proper characterization of TenderAgree-
ment).
74. Id. at 1581, 1584.
75. Md
76. Id.
77. L
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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itself comprise a binding contract,81 although the court noted that
GBLs may also impose additional contractual obligations on the
82parties.
The court's opinion in A-Transport validates prior decisions of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and the GAO,
upon which the Federal Circuit relied."8 A-Transport is remarkable
only because the case was litigated in the first place, and therefore the
opinion had to be written. It breaks no new legal ground; indeed, it
almost mechanically applies hornbook principles of "offer" and
"acceptance." A-Transport illustrates that by fixating upon the regu-
latory aspects of government contracting, one can forget that
government contracts law is, at bottom, contracts law.
C. Contractual Validity-The Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
Under general contract law, a "promise" that does not really
obligate the "promisor" to do anything is illusory and cannot serve as
consideration to support a contract."a Such a flaw in contract
formation undermines the validity of a contract, unless the court
interprets the illusory promise to have some substance 5 or implies
another promise to rescue the contract from attack for failure of
consideration.8 1 One of the principal doctrines by which courts
spare contracts from invalidity has been the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. For commercial contracts, the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) recognizes that duty by statute, 7 and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflects the recognition of that duty at
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (maintaining that actions involving tenders
and GBLs can create valid contracts).
84. SeeRESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 77 (explaining illusory promises as apparent promises
that do not bind promisor).
85. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAGrs § 2.13 (1990) (stating that courts have
interpreted illusory promises to confer nonillusory meaning so as to make contracts enforceable
where parties have established clear intent to enter into contract).
86. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.)
(interpreting exclusive marketing contract as containing implied obligation to make reasonable
efforts to market products in question).
87. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
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common law.' The implied duty of good faith has also achieved
substantial recognition in government contract decisions. 9
In City of Tacoma v. United States,90 the Federal Circuit held that a
utility service contract containing a rate renegotiation clause was not
illusory, and thus was not invalid, because the challenged clause
impliedly required the Government to conduct negotiations with the
contractor in good faith.9 The contract established initial electrical
service rates by which the City of Tacoma, Washington, sold electricity
to McChord Air Force Base, Washington, and provided a mechanism
allowing either party to renegotiate the rate with reasonable cause.92
Between 1973 and 1987, the Air Force and Tacoma renegotiated the
contract nine times.93 In 1988, however, Tacoma passed an ordi-
nance increasing the rates for the Air Force's customer category and
ultimately placed the Air Force in its own rate category.94 The Air
Force refused to pay the new rates without renegotiation of the
contract.
95
When Tacoma and the Air Force could not agree on rates, Tacoma
submitted a certified claim under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978
(CDA)96 seeking to terminate the contract because of the parties'
failure to reach an agreement.9 7 The contracting officer denied the
claim, and Tacoma brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims.98
Tacoma alleged that the change of rates clause rendered the contract
illusory because it allowed the Government arbitrarily to refuse to pay
88. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 205 (stating that every contract imposes duties of
good faith and fair dealing on parties with respect to contract's performance and enforcement);
see, e.g., International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 469, 480 (1992) (holding good
faith and fair dealing requirement implicit in every government contract); Solar Turbines, Inc.
v. United States, 26 Cl. C. 1249, 1273-74 (1992) (agreeing that Restatement's good faith and
fair dealing requirement is implicitly part of contract).
89. See Ralph C. Nash, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: An Emerging Concept?, 3 NASH
& CIBINIc REP. 1 78, 164-71 (1989) (providing study of good faith dealing in government
contracts); Daniel E. Toomey et al., Good Faith and Fair Dealing. The Well-Nigh Irrefragable Need
fora New Standard in Public Contract Law, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 87, 118 (1990) (indicating emerging
trend requiring fair dealing and good faith in government contract negotiations).
90. 31 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff'g28 Cl. Ct. 637 (1993).
91. City of Tacoma v. United States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
92. See City of Tacoma v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 637, 639 (1993) (describing terms of
contract, which contained "change of rate" clause providing for either party to renegotiate rates
on electricity).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 640.
95. See id. (explaining that Government refused to pay for electricity at higher rate because
contract did not incorporate these rate increases). The Government stated that the contract
must be modified before it would pay at the increased rate. Id. In fact, the Government refused
to pay for the electricity altogether. Id.
96. 41 U.S.C. §§ 609-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
97. City of Tacoma, 28 Fed. Cl. at 641.
98. Id. at 642.
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new rates indefinitely-9 The Court of Federal Claims disagreed and
granted summary judgment to the Government." The Federal
Circuit affirmed."'
Relying on its 1991 decision in Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v.
United States,'02 the Federal Circuit held that the contract at issue in
City of Tacoma "impliedly places an obligation on the parties to
negotiate in good faith."" 3 The duty of good faith and the
Government's obligation to abide by justified and reasonable rate
changes established sufficient standards to determine whether or not
the Government negotiated according to the contract." The
Federal Circuit observed that if the parties' negotiations reached a
stalemate, formal dispute procedures under the CDA would assure the
contractor that the Government's promises were not illusory. 5
The Federal Circuit's affirmance of the validity of the contract is
consistent with what a commercial court would have done in similar
circumstances. The holding in City of Tacoma adds one more decision
to the growing body of federal common law that recognizes the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, and the applicability of that duty to
Government and contractors alike. 10 6
D. Best and Final Offers
Until the 1994 term, the Federal Circuit had not considered
whether an agency, in issuing a request for Best and Final Offers
(BAFOs), must explicitly state that discussions are complete and that
offerors may now submit BAFOs. Pursuant to the FAR, an agency is
required to conduct written or oral discussions prior to contract award
with all offerors who are determined to be in the competitive
99. See id. at 645.
100. I. (maintaining that contract was not illusory because change of rate clause merely
allowed contract adaption for changed circumstances and viewing clause as contingency element
in contract). The court continued this line of reasoning in stating that contract contingencies
cause no concern as they are "respectable concepts." Id. The city also alleged that the contract
violated state and federal law, contained latent ambiguities, and was an invalid perpetuity. Id.
at 643-47. The Court of Federal Claims rejected each of these arguments. Id.
101. City of Tacoma v. United States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1132-35 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aftg28 Fed.
Cl. 637 (1993).
102. 945 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
103. City of Tacoma, 31 F.3d at 1132 (quoting Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
104. I&
105. See id. (declaring that CDA still provides contractor with avenue to challenge
undesirable negotiations).
106. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing that courts have found good faith
and fair dealing requirement implicit in government contracts).
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range."'° Following such discussions, the agency must issue a
request for BAFOs to all offerors in the competitive range indicating
that discussions are complete and that offerors may submit BAFOs by
a common cutoff date."~ The Comptroller General has held that
where a notice to offerors does not specifically request offerors to
submit their BAFOs, "language giving notice to all offerors of a
common cutoff date for receipt of offers has the intent and effect of
a request for BAFOs."109
In Cleveland Telecommunications Corp. v. Goldin,"0 the Federal
Circuit, following the decisions of the Comptroller General, held that
an agency had given sufficient notice that an offeror would be
permitted to submit a second BAFO, notwithstanding the agency's
failure to use the phrase "Best and Final Offer" in its written no-
tice.' Because the agency had "complied substantially, if not
literally, with the regulations, " "2 the Federal Circuit concluded that
this was sufficient'
In this procurement, the agency in question, the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA), after making a competitive
range determination and receiving the first round of BAFOs,
discovered that some of the bidders had misconstrued certain
107. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.610(b) (1994) (requiring contracting officer to conduct written or
oral discussions with all responsible offerors whose proposals are in competitive range); see also
Israel Aircraft Indus., Comp. Gen. B-239211, 90-2 CPD 1 84 (1990) (same). Such discussions
may take the form of an opportunity to submit revised proposals. See American KAL Enters.,
Comp. Gen. B-232677.3, 89-1 CPD 1 112 (1989) (holding that language instructing offerors to
submit revised proposals by specific cutoff date has effect of BAFO request).
108. 48 C.F.R. § 15.611 (1994); see also Israel Aircraft 90-2 CPD 1 84, at 4 (stating that upon
completion of discussions, contracting officer shall issue request for BAFOs to all offerors still
within competitive range).
109. IsraelAircraft 90-2 CPD 1 84; see also Aerospace Design, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-247938, 92-2
CPD 33 (1992) (holding that amendment to solicitation that does not specifically request
BAFOs but which gives notice to offerors of common cutoff date for receipt offers has intent
and effect of request for BAFOs); EMS Fusion, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-242529, 91-1 CPD 447
(1991) (holding that oral request for final submissions by a common cutoff date and subsequent
confirmation by telecopy complied with FAR requirements regarding requests for BAFOs); VG
Instruments, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-241484, 91-1 CPD 1 137 (1991) (concluding that notice that
negotiations were to close with submission of revised proposals was adequate notice that BAFOs
were being requested). The General Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) appears to
have reached the same conclusion. See Integrated Sys. Analysts, Inc., GSBCA No. 10750-P, 91-1
B.C.A. (CCH) 23,383, at 117,349 (1990) (noting that "[w]hile the [agency] should have
expressly stated that it was requesting a second round of BAFOs, the (protestor's] conclusion
that negotiations were still open was unreasonable given the statement that the [agency] did not
intend to hold further discussions").
110. 43 F.3d 655 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
111. Cleveland Telecommunications Corp. v. Goldin, 43 F.3d 655, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
112. I at 659.
113. IMt at 658-59.
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information raised during discussions. 14  As a result, the agency
decided to reopen discussions and to provide the offerors with an
opportunity to amend or submit new BAFOs.'15 The agency provid-
ed this information to each of the bidders, including the protestor,
both in writing and orally but, in its letter, failed to use the phrase
"Best and Final Offer."'1 6  The protestor chose not to amend its
BAFO or to submit a new BAFO. 1 17
In its protest, Cleveland Telecommunications contended that
certain defects in the agency's letter prevented the company from
submitting a new BAFO."" Specifically, Cleveland Telecommunica-
tions, the protestor, alleged that the agency's notice was legally
deficient because it failed to comply with sections 15.611 (a) and (b)
of the FAR and with the NASA FAR Supplement. 9 Pursuant to
these provisions, the protestor alleged that the agency's letter should
have explicitly requested a second round of BAFOs and stated that
the discussions were concluded and that this was an opportunity to
submit a BAFO. 2° The General Services Board of Contract Appeals
(GSBCA or the Board) held that the agency's notice complied with
the regulations and that the protestor was given every opportunity to
amend its BAFO or to file a second one.
12
'
In affirming the decision of the GSBCA, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the agency had complied substantially with the
regulations and that the issues raised by the protestor were distinc-
tions without differences. 22  Rejecting Cleveland Telecommunica-
tion's arguments, the Federal Circuit held that the agency's letter
provided the protestor with an opportunity to submit a BAFO and it.
was an inconsequential fact that the letter did not use the words "Best
114. Id. at 657 (discussing how some bidders had misconstrued NASA discussions to mean
that proposals must be based on incumbent wage rates).
115. 1&
116. The letter stated:
Based on responses received from some offerors to the questions sent out by the
Government during oral and written discussions, the Government has determined a
need to conduct a second round of discussions. Therefore, while the Government has
no further questions or need for clarification concerning your referenced proposal, you
are hereby given the opportunity to submit any amendments you may have to your
referenced proposal. The final cut-off for receipt of any amendments is 4:30 p.m.,
local time, August 25, 1993.Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 658-59.
119. See. U at 657-68 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 1815.613-71 (1994)).
120. Id. at 658.
121. Id. at 658-59.
122. d. at 658.
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and Final Offer" or explicitly request a second round of BAFOs. 3
Properly construed, the court reasoned, the letter should be interpret-
ed to mean that discussions were concluded and that offerors could
submit a second BAFO or amend their earlier BAFOs. 2 4
The Federal Circuit also rejected the protestor's assertion that the
letter was faulty because it did not state, as required by the regula-
tions, that discussions were complete.'2 The Federal Circuit
concluded that the Government made this point sufficiently clear
when it stated in its letter that "'the government has no further
questions or need for clarification concerning your referenced
proposal.", 26  Moreover, the protestor should have known that,
pursuant to the FAR, discussions were complete when the Govern-
ment requested a BAFO. 27 Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the agency's failure to provide notice that any modifications or
amendments were subject to the relevant solicitation provisions, as
required by section 15.611(b) (4) of the FAR, 28 did not prejudice
the protestor and, therefore, was harmless error.2 1
The Federal Circuit's holding in this case was predictable and in
accordance with the decisions of both the Comptroller General and
the GSBCA. The law on this issue now appears to be clear-in
notifying offerors that discussions are complete and BAFOs may be
submitted, close enough is good enough.
E. Mutual Mistake
Mutual mistake is a flaw in contract formation that is often argued
but seldom prevails."3 Both commercial contract law"3' and feder-
al government contracts law'3 2 require the party alleging mistake to
123. Id.
124. I&
125. Id. at 659.
126. Id. (quoting letter sent to all bidders in competitive range).
127. See id. (providing that contracting officer shall issue request for BAFO "[ulpon
completion of discussions") (citing 48 C.F.R. § 15.611(a) (1994)).
128. See it. (stating that BAFO notice "is subject to the Late Submissions, Modifications and
Withdrawal of Proposals provisions of the Solicitation") (citing 48 C.F.R. § 15.611 (b) (4) (1994)).
129. Id.
130. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152, cmt. b (demonstrating that, in order to prevail,
mutual mistake must constitute basic assumption on which both parties made contract).
131. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152 (analyzing when mistake by both parties makes
a contract voidable in commercial setting).
132. See Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (involving alleged
mutual mistake of computational errors in pricing factor); Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d
745 (Fed. Cir.) (concerning alleged mutual mistake regarding degree of radioactive waste health
hazards and clean up costs eventually required), cert. denied; 498 U.S. 811 (1990). See generally
Ralph C. Nash, Postscript 1I: Mutual Mistake of Basic Assumption, 8 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 47
(1994) (discussing effect of mutual mistake of basic assumption about existing facts that affect
2130
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establish four demanding elements: (1) both parties must have been
mistaken in their belief regarding a fact existing at the time of
contracting; 3 (2) the mistaken belief must have constituted a basic
assumption on which the contract was made;M  (3) the mistake
must have had a material effect on the bargain;135 and (4) the
contract must not have placed the risk of the mistake on the party
that is seeking relief.136  Remedies available for mutual mistake
include rescission and reformation. 37 Commercial contract law
favors rescission," while government contracts decisions favor
reformation.'39
In Dairyland Power Cooperative v. United States,'" the Federal Circuit
held that the parties' erroneous belief as to the future business
climate cannot constitute an existing fact at the time of contract-
ing. 4' The parties' original contract, executed in 1962, called for
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to construct a nuclear power
reactor, and for Dairyland, a public utility, to operate that reactor at
Dairyland's site.142 After several years of operations, AEC, in accor-
dance with the 1962 contract, offered to sell the power plant to
future) [hereinafter Postscript 11].
133. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152(1).
134. RESTATEIENT, supra note 47, § 152(1).
135. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152(1).
136. REsTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152(1).
137. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152(2). Reformation is an equitable, court-ordered
remedy to correct a written contract to cause it to reflect the proper intentions of the parties.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (6th ed. 1990). On the other hand, recission is one party's
disaffirmance of a voidable contract and an "avoidance" of obligations thereunder. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 85, § 9.3, at 520 (mutual mistake); ef. id. § 4.15, at 426 (misrepresen-
tation); § 9.4, at 532-33 (unilateral mistake).
138. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 152(1) (stating that "the contract is voidable by
the adversely affected party") with RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 155 (allowing for revision, not
rescission, where writing fails to express agreement because of mistake of both parties).
139. See G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 662, 675 (1984) (reforming contract
involving dam construction); Higgs v. United States, 546 F.2d 373, 376 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (reforming
contract to provide for two parcels of land, rather than one, where both parties intended that
sale involved two parcels); see also McDonald Welding & Mach. Co., ASBCA No. 36284, 94-3
B.CA. (CCH) 1 27,181 (1994) (reforming mutual mistake regarding production facility and
schedule); Louisiana-Pacific Corp., ASBCA No. 80-186-3, 81-1 B.CA. (CCH) 1 14,928, at 73,865
(1981) (rectifying mutual mistake in timber renewal contract where mutual mistake was found);
In re Michaud, Comp. Gen. B-182299, 75-1 CPD 52 (1975) (reforming contract involving
mutual mistake regarding land amount).
140. 16 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aft'g27 Fed. Cl. 805 (1993).
141. Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197,1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that parties' contemplation of future availability of commercial reprocessing at time of contract
does not constitute existing fact). The court held that the party seeking reformation of a
contract based on a claim of mutual mistake of fact must demonstrate that both parties
misapprehended an existing fact. Id. at 1202.
142. Id. at 1199.
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Dairyland' 43 In 1973, in light of changing economic conditions in
the nuclear power industry,'44 the parties agreed that Dairyland
would purchase the plant for one dollar.' This 1973 sales con-
tract, which Dairyland recognized as "a calculated risk," superceded
the parties' original 1962 operations contract.
146
Dairyland continued to operate the nuclear power plant, but it was
never able to obtain full-term operating licenses. 47 In addition, the
market for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel , collapsed,4 and
Dairyland's costs to store the plant's spent nuclear fuel assemblies on-
site exceeded $97 million.14 1 In light of these adverse develop-
ments, Dairyland closed the plant in 1987 and decided to try to
rescind its 1973 purchase of the plant.'5° It filed certified claims
under the CDA with the contracting officer' and later filed suit in
the Court of Federal Claims for rescission of the 1973 sales contract,
or in the alternative, for damages exceeding $97 million. 52 Among
Dairyland's theories was mutual mistake of fact. 5
The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment to the
Government."s It held that damages were precluded by release
language contained in the 1973 sales contract, and that rescission was
not authorized because Dairyland could not establish the fourth
element of mutual mistake-that the utility had not assumed the risk
of the parties' mistaken belief about the future availability of commer-
cial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.'55 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Govern-
ment, but it did so because of Dairyland's "inability as a matter of law
to satisfy the first element of the doctrine of mutual mistake of
143. Id. (providing for sale at AEC's option to dismantle plant if not purchased at price of
construction costs).
144. Id. at 1200 (noting that market fluctuations occurred until April 7, 1977, when President
Carter indefinitely suspended commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuel).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (noting that reprocessing industry never recovered from collapse despite President
Reagan's lift of commercial reprocessing ban on October 8, 1981).
149. Id. at 1201.
150. Id. at 1200.
151. Id. As a dispute resolution mechanism, the CDA is not really even "violated." Id.
152. Id. at 1200-01.
153. Id. (arguing alternative theories of commercial impracticability and frustration of
purpose).
154. Id. at 1201.
155. Id.
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fact" 56 -that the mistake must relate to an existing fact at the time
of contracting. 157
The Federal Circuit reasoned that "[t ] he availability of commercial
reprocessing in the future cannot constitute an existing fact at the
time of the 1973 sale contract."'58 The Court relied on the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts,'59 general commercial contract law,"6
and its own 1987 decision in American Employers Insurance Co. v. United
States, 6 to conclude that Dairyland "cannot establish mutual
mistake of fact as a matter of law because the parties were not
mistaken as to an existing fact.""16
In Dairyland Power, the Federal Circuit reached a predictable result
based on established legal principles, consistent with the general
commercial law of mutual mistake, which seldom allows contractors
to avoid the burdens of their obligations." Nonetheless, the
Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the Court of Claims, have not
been entirely consistent in deciding or explaining their decisions
about mutual mistakes that concern assumptions about the future.16
The DairylandPowerdecision, taken together with the Federal Circuit's
1990 decision in Atlas Corp. v. United States,' indicates that the
Federal Circuit is less willing today than it and the Court of Claims
have been in the past to "stretch" the doctrine of mutual mistake to
156. Id, at 1202.
157. Id,
158. Id. at 1202-03.
159. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 151 cmt. a (1981)).
160. Id. at 1201-03 (citing Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir.), celt. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990)).
161. 812 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The court held that the failure of the settlement
agreement to contemplate the possibility of filing latent occupational injuri claims years later
did not constitute a mutual mistake of fact that could justify contract reformation. American
Employers Ins. Co. v. United States, 812 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
162. Dahyland4 16 F.3d at 1203.
163. See Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (denying
successful bidder on timber sale contract right to withdraw bid and reform contract); Atlas Corp.
v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756-58 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (requiring uranium and thoium
producers to pay for clean up costs and denying right to reform contract).
164. Compare Atlas, 895 F.2d at 752 (ruling that reformation is not proper remedy where
parties negotiated uranium and thorium mill contract without knowledge of future occupational
injury claims or without assuming such facts) with Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271,
1275-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (granting relief where Government had "superior knowledge" about
possible future chemical reactions to storage conditions of contractor's radios) and National
Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 112 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (reforming contract for
production of shells where Government had knowledge of extra costs associated with
manufacturing processes) and R.M. Hollingshead Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 285, 286
(Ct. Cl. 1953) (reforming contract for DDT concentrate that was damaged because Government
required storage in metal containers); see also Postscript II, supra note 132, at 123 (noting that
although assumptions concerning future events are not about existing facts, some court cases
grant relief for "mutual mistakes as to what will be encountered during performance").
165. 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denieA, 498 U.S. 811 (1990).
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cover assumptions about future events, however skillfully parties might
plead.
E Scope of GSBCA Bid Protest Review
By statute, the GSBCA has jurisdiction to review the decisions of
contracting officers in procurements that are subject to the Brooks
Act.1" Although the law does not explicitly say that the GSBCA is
authorized to conduct de novo review of agency evaluations, 7 the
GSBCA has consistently asserted that right." The Federal Circuit
has never specifically endorsed or rejected the GSBCA's position in
a precedential opinion, 69 although it has sharply criticized the
GSBCA's second-guessing of agencies' determinations of their own
procurement needs. 7 ° Because the Federal Circuit has never
166. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1988) (assigning to GSBCA bid protest authority covering
automated data processing contracts). The general purpose of the Brooks Act is to provide the
GSA with broad authority "to coordinate and provide for the economic and efficient purchase,
lease, and maintenance of automatic data processing equipment by Federal agencies."
Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. GSA Bd. Contract App., 792 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
167. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(h)(1) (1988) (stating that GSBCA's review of contracting officer
decisions "shall be conducted under the standard applicable to review of contracting officer final
decisions by boards of contract appeals"). In turn, the CDA states that "(s]pecific findings of
fact [by a contracting officer] ... if made, shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding."
41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). However, the CDA says nothing more explicit about
the scope of review of a contracting officer's decision by a board of contract appeals. See id.
§ 607.
168. The seminal case is Lanier Business Products, GSBCA No. 7702-P, 85-2 B.CA. 1 18,033,
at 90,495-96, reh kdenied 85-2 B.CA 1 18,101 (1985). The GSBCA asserted its right of de novo
review with respect to a protest involving automatic data processing procurement agency
determination. Id. at 90,496. Subsequent decisions state the proposition virtually as a truism,
without further discussion or analysis. See, e-g., OAO Corp., GSBCA No. 10186-P, 90-1 B.CA
(CCH) 1 22,332, at 112,234 (1989) (per curiam) (reviewing decision in automatic data
processing professional support services contract on de novo basis); Federal Sys. Group, Inc.,
GSBCA No. 9924-P, 89-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 21,758, at 109,499 (1989) (reviewing, de novo, contract
of United States Railroad Retirement Board to purchase IBM terminals and finding violation of
Federal Information Resources Management Regulation requirements); Del Net, Inc., GSBCA
No. 9178-P, 88-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 20,342, at 102,869 (1987) (reviewing contract decision
regarding maintenance of data processing equipment on de novo basis), aff'dper curiai, 861 F.2d
728 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Computer Lines, GSBCA No. 8206-P, 86-1 B.C.A. 1 18,653, at 93,805
(1985) (reviewing automatic data processing procurement contract on de novo basis).
169. See Del Net, Inc. v. United States, 861 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming GSBCA
decision that asserted its right of de novo review).
170. See Data Gen. Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (lambasting
board's actions for overly questioning judgment of agency in determining its needs). In Data
General, the Federal Circuit criticized the GSBCA as being "driven by its own assessment of the
agency's 'true' data processing needs," i& at 1547, and lectured the GSBCA that "the Brooks Act
specifically prohibits the board from imposing on the agency its own views of the agency's data
processing needs... [which was] precisely what happened here," id. at 1551. The court sharply
concludeh
"Stupid" or not, the board has no warrant to question the agency's judgment or to
revise its delegation of procurement authority to ensure that the agency's assessment
of its "true" needs is in harmony with the board's. The board has neither the authority
nor the expertise to second-guess the agency.
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directly addressed the right of the GSBCA to conduct de novo
review,17 1 the court has never analyzed the tension between conduct-
ing de novo review and avoiding substitution of judgment.
In Grumman Data Systems Corp. v. Widnall,172 the Federal Circuit,
seemingly unaware of the novelty and complexity of the issues before
it, held that the GSBCA may not only exercise de novo review, but also
may conduct its own "best value" analysis without substituting its
judgment for that of the agency, at least as long as the GSBCA
reaches the same result as the agency.73 The Air Force had issued
a Request for Proposal (RFP) to purchase an office automation system
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4 The proposal that offered the "best
overall value" to the Air Force was to receive the contract. 75 The
Air Force evaluated competing proposals received from Grumman
and Contel against each other on a "head-to-head" basis, in addition
to evaluating them against absolute evaluation criteria, even though
the former evaluation was arguably not authorized by the RFP.76
The Air Force then selected Contel's technically superior proposal,
even though Contel's cost was almost sixty percent higher than
Grumman's.
177
Grumman protested to the GSBCA, which found that the Air Force
had not adequately analyzed cost/technical trade-off issues and
remanded the matter to the Air Force. 78  After conducting an
extensive best value analysis, the Air Force reaffirmed its selection of
Contel, and Grumman protested again. 79  This time the GSBCA
held that the Air Force's best value analysis was flawed and embarked
upon its own analysis."8 In doing so, the GSBCA took into account
evidence and expert testimony offered at the board hear-
h/. at 1552; see also Andersen Consulting Co. v. United States, 959 F.2d 929,935 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(characterizing Data General case as meaning that "the board's independent analysis of needs is
both irrelevant and illegal").
171. See supra note 168 (listing cases where GSBCA has asserted right of de novo review).
172. 15 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
173. Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing
Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1047. See generally CarlJ. Peckinpaugh &Joseph M. Goldstein, Best Value Source
Selection-Contracting for Value, or Unfettered Agenty Discretion?, 22 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 275, 336-38
(1993) (arguing for greater agency disclosure and consistency in evaluation of FAR determina-
tions).
176. Grumman Data Systems, 15 F.3d at 1045-46.
177. Id.
178. IX (noting that GSBCA directed Air Force to determine whether Contel's technical
enhancements justified almost 60% higher cost than competitor Grumman's cost).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1048 (noting that Air Force deviated from standard accounting principles in
conducting best value analysis).
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ing-information that the Air Force had not considered.'' The
GSBCA concluded that the Air Force had reached the right result for
the wrong reasons and upheld the award to Contel.11
In affirming the GSBCA, the Federal Circuit stated that an
"agency's procurement selection is reviewed de novo by the board,""8 '
thereby upholding the GSBCA's previously unendorsed position on
that issue." After acknowledging prior decisions in which it had
cautioned the GSBCA "not [to] second guess an agency's procure-
ment decision and/or substitute its own judgment for that of the
government,""a the Federal Circuit concluded that no such substitu-
tion ofjudgment had occurred because the GSBCA had reached the
same conclusion as the Air Force:
The board cannot be accused of substituting its own procurement
opinion because it upheld the Air Force's selection of the Contel
proposal. While it is true that the board based its decision upon a
different best value analysis than that relied upon by the Air Force,
such action is entirely permissible under a de novo standard of
review because the reviewing board is not limited to the findings
made by the agency or contained in the initial decision.'85
The Federal Circuit finessed the hard question with which the
GSBCA had grappled, of how to interpret the RFP's evaluation
criteria, finding that Grumman waived its right to argue that issue by
having raised it too late. 87 Finally, the court refused to overturn
the award on account of the GSBCA's finding that the Air Force's
methodology "may have violated some technical accounting princi-
ples," "8s because "small errors made by the procuring agency are not
sufficient grounds for rejecting an entire procurement."8 9
Whether or not the Federal Circuit reached the right result in
Grumman Data Systems, the court's opinion is far from satisfying. The
181. d. (considering testimony regarding accounting principles offered by parties' respective
technical experts).
182. Id. (concluding that mistakes in accounting constituted only minimal error and did not
affect Air Force's ultimate decision).
183. Id. at 1046 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing SMS Data Prods., Inc. v. United States, 111 S. Ct 2011 (1991); Anderson
Consulting Co. v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Data Gen. Corp. v. United
States, 915 F.2d 1544, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
186. I. at 1046-47 (citing Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
187. Id. at 1047 (holding that Grumman's arguments were untimely because they were raised
after bids were submitted).
188. Id. at 1048 (citing Grumman Data Sys. Corp., GSBCA No. 11939-P, 93-2 B.CA. (CCH)
25,776, at 128,279 (1993)).
189. Id.
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court's one-paragraph endorsement of de novo review by the
GSBCA, 1' together with the court's citation to an inapplicable
statutory provision in support of that conclusion,1 9 suggest that the
court did not fully appreciate the significance of this issue or give it
the attention that it deserved. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's
determination that de novo review by the GSBCA does not constitute
an improper substitution of judgment when the GSBCA agrees with
an agency's award192 begs the question of whether de novo review
that reaches a different conclusion constitutes impermissible second-
guessing. This issue will remain open for future consideration by the
GSBCA and the Federal Circuit. Finally, the court's avoidance of the
thorny question involving how to interpret the RFP, when the GSBCA
did not evade addressing this critical issue on the merits,193 reflects
an unadmirable penchant for deciding cases on procedural rather
than substantive grounds.
G. Award of GSBCA Bid Protest Costs
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA),'"9 which
authorized the GSBCA to hear bid protests of Brooks Act
procurements,19 also authorized the GSBCA to award a prevailing
protestor "the costs of-(i) filing and pursuing the protest, including
reasonable attorney's fees, and (ii) bid and proposal preparation." 96
The GSBCA had interpreted this statutory authority broadly to include
"all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred" in the filing and
pursuit of a protest. 97 In May 1992, however, based on the Su-
preme Court's decision in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
190. I& at 1046.
191. l& (citing 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) as support for its conclusion). Section 609(b) governs
the scope ofjudicial review of board of contract appeals decisions, not the scope of review of
contracting officer decisions. See41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988) (stating"the decision of the agency
board on any question of law shall not be final or conclusive").
192. Grumman Data Systems, 15 F.3d at 1046-47.
193. 1&t at 1047 (citing Grumman Data Sys. Corp. GSBCA No. 11939-P, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
25,776, at 128,277 (1993).
194. 40 U.S.C. § 759(0 (1988).
195. UIt § 759(f)(3)(A).
196. ld. § 759(f)(5)(C). See generally Ralph C. Nash, Recovay of Protest Costs: Confusing and
Conflicting Rues, 6 NASH & CIBINIC REP. .58, at 150 (1992) (suggesting that broad language of
Brooks Act conflicts with other specific statutory provisions awarding attorney fees, expert witness
fees, and salaries of protesting offeror's employees).
197. See Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. NASA, GSBCA No. 10000-C (9835-P), 92-3 B.C.A (CCH)
1 25,118, at 125,219 (1992) (awarding reasonable fees for expenses incurred pursuing protest,
including expert and attorney fees, to contractor), vacated, 16 F.3d 1177, 79 Cont. Gas. Fed.
(CCH) 76,615 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Casey, 198 the GSBCA reinterpreted CICA's protest cost provisions
narrowly in Sterling Federal Systems, Inc. v. NASA.' The GSBCA, in
Sterling, denied a prevailing protestor the recovery of the fees and
expenses of nontestifying expert consultants and the salaries of in-
house personnel who had worked on the successful protest.2" On
appeal in Sterling Federal Systems, Inc. v. Goldin, °1 the Federal Circuit
held that the GSBCA is statutorily authorized, although not required,
to award expert consultant fees and in-house personnel salaries to a
prevailing protestor,"° and that the Supreme Court's decision in
West Virginia did not undermine the "unique and innovative" protest
provisions of CICA.2°3
Sterling successfully protested a procurement action by NASA and
then filed with the GSBCA a request for the reimbursement of
approximately $600,000 of costs it had incurred in filing and pursuing
the protest.' 4 Sterling's claim included $94,000 for the fees and
expenses of expert consultants its counsel retained to help analyze
technical issues in the protest because the GSBCA's protective order
did not permit Sterling's own employees to have access to protected
material. 5 Sterling's claim also included $47,000 for in-house labor
costs of employees who had testified in the protest." 6
The GSBCA recognized that, under its prior decisions, it had
awarded both of these types of expenses to successful protestors,
0 7
but the Board felt constrained to reexamine the issue in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia University Hospitals.2" In
that case, the Supreme Court held that the statutory authorization for
federal courts to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to a prevailing
party under the Civil Rights Act?' did not impliedly repeal the
statutory limitations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920, which do not
authorize the payment of "fees for services rendered by an expert
198. 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (holding that expert fees in civil rights litigation may not be shifted
to losing party as part of reasonable attorney's fees).
199. Sterling, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH), at 125,219.
200. Id. at 125,220-21.
201. 16 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacating and remanding Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. NASA,
92-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 25,118 (1992).
202. I. at 1188.
203. Id. at 1187 (quoting H.R. RF.P. No. 861, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1431 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2119, 2119).
204. Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. Goldin, 16 F.3d 1177, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
205. Id. at 1179-80.
206. Id
207. Id. at 1180 (citing Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. NASA, GSBCA No. 10000-C (9835-P) 92-3
B.CA (CCH) 1 25,118, at 125,219 (1994)).
208. Id. (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
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employed by a party in a nontestimonial advisory capacity."210
Considering the question en banc, the GSBCA construed its statutory
fee-shifting authority together with the Supreme Court's decision in
West Virginia University Hospitals.2" The GSBCA found that the
language of the Brooks Act was "fundamentally akin to that construed
by the [Supreme] Court in West Virginia."212 Consequently, the
GSBCA held that the types of costs it could impose on the Govern-
ment under the Brooks Act were limited to the kinds of witness fees
that federal courts were authorized to award under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821
and 1920.21 The GSBCA also denied the reimbursement of the
salaries of in-house witnesses in excess of $30 per day plus govern-
ment-level per diems, by analogy to cases under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA).214
Based upon its reading of West Virginia University Hospitals, the
GSBCA felt compelled to depart from its own precedents and denied
Sterling reimbursement of its nontestimonial expert and in-house
labor costs. 2 5 Four GSBCAjudges dissented in part, submitting two
different opinions.216 One opinion argued that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821
and 1920 do not apply to the GSBCA,217 and the other opinion
emphasized the statutory discretion that CICA conferred on the board
to award costs to successful protestors.
The Federal Circuit vacated the GSBCA's decision, holding that
West Virginia University Hospitals and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 do not prevent
the GSBCA from awarding salaries or expert fees associated with the
filing and pursuit of a protest, nor does CICA require the GSBCA to
do so.219 The Federal Circuit agreed with a dissenting opinion of
the Board that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920, by their terms, do not
210. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87 (1991).
211. See Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. NASA, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,118, at 125,216 (1992)
(reasoning that because expert witness fees should not be recoverable as attorney's fees under
Supreme Court's West Virginia University Hospitals decision, expert consulting fees are not
reimbursable to successful protestor as cost of filing and pursuing protest).
212. Id at 125,220.
213. I at 125,217-18 (listing costs that may be reimbursed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and
1920, such as clerk, marshall, court report, and witness fee, interpreters fees, and travel fees for
witnesses).
214. i. (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 504, administrative counterpart to Equal Access to justice Act
(EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, to justify denial of expert witness fees).
215. I&
216. See id. at 125,222.
217. IM. at 125,222-23 (William & LaBella, Bd.JJ., dissenting in part).
218. I. at 125,223-25 (Vergilio & LaBella, Bd.jJ., Suchanek, ChiefBd.J., dissenting in part).
219. See Sterling Fed. Sys., Inc. v. Goldin, 16 F.3d 1177, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding West
Virginia and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 nonbinding on GSBCA).
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apply directly to the GSBCA.22° The Federal Circuit also found that
the term "costs" in § 1920 was not a term of art that merely codified
a "traditional definition of costs" or simply meant only the costs listed
in that statute.22' Instead, the court interpreted § 1920 as one of
many statutory sources that authorized or limited "taxable litigation
costs." 222 The Federal Circuit did not believe that the rationale of
West Virginia University Hospitals controlled this case because "CICA
alone" provides the Board's statutory authority to order cost-shifting
in Brooks Act protests, and that CICA's authority is "entirely apart
from section 1920. " 21
The Federal Circuit read the EAJA as supporting a broad reading
of the GSBCA's authority, not the narrow reading that the Board's
majority had given it below, because Congress failed to incorporate 28
U.S.C. § 1920 into CICA, as it had into the EAJA.224 The Federal
Circuit refused to do what it called "contort[ing] the language" of
CICA simply to honor the principle that waivers of sovereign
immunity should be strictly construed: "The rule requiring strict
construction of waivers of sovereign immunity is not a talisman that
permits the government to avoid liability in all cases." 225 Finally, the
court rejected the GSBCA's view that the Board could never have
greater power than that of the federal courts.226 The issue, as the
Federal Circuit saw it, was merely that "the board's authority was
different."2 27
Having decided that CICA permits the GSBCA to award costs other
than those which the federal courts may award under 28 U.S.C. §§
1821 and 1920, the Federal Circuit then proceeded to address the
issue of what costs the Board should award. The court found that
"Congress has entrusted the GSBCA with some discretion to define
precisely what those costs are,"228 but the court did not "perceive
the GSBCA's law on what it had previously allowed as well set-
tled."21 Consequently, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to
220. Id. at 1182 (stating that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821 "authorize the 'court(s] of the
United States' to tax certain items as costs" and that "GSBCA is not a 'court of the United
States'") (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920).
221. Id. at 1183.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1184.
224. Id. at 1185 (stating that "Congress's failure in the administrative EAJA § 504 to
incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 1920, as it did in EAJA § 2412, indicates Congress's deliberate choice
not to have section 1920 apply in the agency context").
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1186.
228. Id. at 1187.
229. Id. at 1188.
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the GSBCA for a decision whether nontestimonial expert and
employee costs should be allowed, advising the GSBCA that it "must
either distinguish these costs from those awarded under previous
[GSBCA] cases orjustify a change in practice." 23°
Sterling reflects a sensible construction of CICA, and reasonably
distinguishes the Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia University
Hospitals as inapplicable to the GSBCA bid protests. The logic of the
decision has been reinforced, and the result codified, by federal
procurement reform legislation enacted by the last Congress in the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA). 2"1  FASA
authorizes both the GSBCA and the GAO to award interested parties
the costs of filing and pursuing protests, including reasonable
attorneys' fees "and consultant and expert witness fees."232 Unfortu-
nately for protestors, what FASA gave with one hand, it took with the
other, by capping the Government's reimbursement of attorneys' fees
at $150 per hour and, except for small business concerns, limiting its
reimbursement of consultant and expert witness fees at the highest
rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the Govern-
ment.238
II. INTERPRETATION, PERFORMANCE, AND ADMINISTRATION
A. Contract Interpretation
"A contract is ambiguous if its terms are 'susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation."2  Ambiguities in government
contracts take one of two forms-latent or patent.235 Latent ambi-
230. IL As of the date of this Article, the GSBCA had not issued a decision on remand. The
board had, however, cited the Federal Circuit's decision as authority for the proposition that it
has discretion to define reimbursable protest costs. See Science Applications Int'l Corp. v.
Department of the Navy, 94-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 27,262 (1994) (stating that the Federal Circuit
in Stering "noted that we have generally awarded expert fees").
231. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. and 40 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FASA].
232. Id. § 1403(b) (2). Section 1403 of the FASA applies to decisions of protests by the GAO,
and § 1435 applies to awards of costs by the GAO. See id. §§ 1403, 1435. The GAO provision
is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c) (1) (A) and the GSBCA provision will be codified at 40 U.S.C.
§ 759(f) (5) (C).
233. FASA, supra note 231, §§ 1403(b)(2), 1435(a).
234. Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see
also Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating rule
is so "generally established" that it requires no citation of authority).
235. NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 50, at 20 (defining ambiguity as "[clontract language
that is capable of being understood to have more than one meaning"). The test for ambiguity
is "whether reasonable persons would find the contract subject to more than one interpreta-
tion." Id. SeegenerallyJOHN CIBINIC,JR. & RALPH C. NAsH,JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACrS 102-77 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing various approaches to government contract
interpretation) [hereinafter CIBINIC & NASH].
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guities result when contract terms are seemingly precise on their face,
but due to factors extrinsic to the contract, are susceptible to more
than one interpretation.2 Patent ambiguities, on the other hand,
are deemed to be facially obvious, resulting from unclear or unintelli-
gible contract language 3 7  Latent ambiguities are normally inter-
preted against the drafter so long as the interpretation of the party
who seeks recovery is reasonable.2 This rule of interpreting
ambiguous contracts against the drafter, known as contra proferentem,
however, does not apply to patent ambiguities,3 9 for patent ambigu-
ities place a duty of inquiry on a contractor who will eventually seek
additional compensation on account of the ambiguity.24 This duty
of inquiry requires the contractor to raise and resolve the ambiguity
with the Government prior to submitting a bid in circumstances
where the contractor was aware or should have been aware of the
ambiguity. 4' Failure to inquire into a patent ambiguity will defeat a
later claim for equitable adjustment, regardless of the reasonableness
of the contractor's interpretation of the ambiguous term.42
236. NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 50, at 20.
237. NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 50, at 20.
238. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(finding that contract contained latent ambiguity and consequently, should be interpreted
against drafter); see also United States v. Turner Constr. Co., 819 F.2d 283, 285 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(noting that where contract contains latent ambiguity, courts inquire into reasonableness of
interpretation by non-drafting party).
239. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, 980 F.2d at 1434-35; see also Interwest Constr. v. Brown,
29 F.3d 611, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (instructing courts reviewing government contracts to first
determine whether ambiguity is patent so as to impose duty to seek clarification); Community
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding patent
ambiguities not automatically resolved against drafter, rather such ambiguities place a
clarification requirement on contractor); Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288,
1291 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing resolution of patent and latent ambiguities in contracts).
240. Community Heating, 987 F.2d at 1579 (discussing duty to inquire and seek clarification
of contract where patent ambiguity exists); see also Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, 980 F.2d at
1434-35 (stating duty of inquiry exists when patent ambiguity appears in contract); Turner Constr.
Co., 819 F.2d at 285 (stating that appropriate focus centers on whether present ambiguity was
patent, thereby raising duty to inquire, and if not patent ambiguity, "whether the interpretation
of the contract by [the nonwriting party] was reasonable"); Fortec Constructors, 760 F.2d at 1291
(asserting that patent ambiguities create duty of inquiry "regardless of the reasonableness of the
contractor's interpretation").
241. See Community Heating, 987 F.2d at 1579-80 (holding that it is not enough for contractor
to make initial inquiry, but that contractor must pursue inquiry until ambiguity is clarified); see
also Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, 980 F.2d at 1434-35 (stating that duty of inquiry "requires the
contractor to 'inquire of the contracting officer the true meaning of the contract before
submitting a bid'" (quoting Newson v. United States, 676 F.2d 647, 649 (Cl. Ct. 1982)); CIBINIC
& NASH, supra note 235, at 170-71 (discussing contractor's duty to seek pre-bid submission
clarification of patent ambiguities of which it knew or should have known).
242. See Community Heating, 987 F.2d at 1580 (holding that where party did not fully inquire
into patently ambiguous contract, party "acted at its own risk when it proceeded to perform on
the contract"); see also Fortec Constructors, 760 F.2d at 1291-92 (holding that where patent
ambiguity existed and party did not seek clarification, party should be denied equitable relief).
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The Federal Circuit in Interwest Construction v. BrownYl applied
these principles and found that a contract for the supply of air
conditioning equipment was unambiguous. 2' The contract re-
quired delivery of an air conditioning system with a specified cooling
capacity that could be converted for use with different refriger-
ants. 24 Interwest's system, while capable of operating at the re-
quired capacity using the refrigerant supplied by the manufacturer
upon delivery, could not operate at the required capacity following
conversion.246
Interwest complied with the Government's interpretation of the
contract by upgrading the delivered equipment and then sought an
equitable adjustment from the Veterans Affairs Board to cover the
associated costs.2 47 Interwest argued that the contract was ambigu-
ous because the contract did not expressly set forth the post-conver-
sion capacity requirement.2' Moreover, Interwest argued that it was
"technically and commercially infeasible" to convert equipment
"without sacrificing performance."249 The contracting officer denied
Interwest's request for an equitable adjustment." ° The Veterans
Administration Board of Contract Appeals (VABCA) upheld the
decision of the contracting officer, concluding that the contract was
not ambiguous." r Moreover, because the ambiguity was patent,
Interwest should have sought clarification from the Government. 2
The Federal Circuit affirmed the VABCA's decision, adding that even
if the ambiguity was latent, Interwest still could not recover because
its interpretation was unreasonable.253
The Federal Circuit found that the specified system characteristics,
including the required capacity, were performance criteria that set
forth "unqualified" specifications and "established a minimum that
must be met."21 To find that the performance specifications only
applied prior to conversion, and not after, would leave the post-
243. 29 F.3d 611 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
244. Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 613-14 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
245. Id. at 613.
246. Id
247. Id. at 614.
248. Id. at 613-14.
249. Itt at 614.
250. l&
251. It
252. It at 614-16.
253. Idt
254. It at 615. The court also stated that "'[p]eiformance type specifications advise the
contractor what the final product must be capable of accomplishing."' Id. (quoting JOHN
CIBINIC,JR. & RALPH C. NASHJR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 341 (2d ed. 1986)).
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conversion cooling capacity requirement "'entirely up to the bid-
ders."'" 5 The court therefore found that Interwest's interpretation
was "clearly unreasonable and contrary to common sense., 2-16
In reaching this result, the Federal Circuit refused to consider
extrinsic evidence including: (1) the commercial or technical
feasibility of the Government's requirements; or (2) the fact that
documentation clearly stating the performance requirements for the
converted equipment was omitted from the solicitation.5 The
court concluded that all of this evidence was extrinsic and, therefore,
refused to consider it or any other evidence that could create an
ambiguity where none otherwise existed.258
Moreover, the court found that even if one accepted that the
contract was ambiguous, the ambiguity was patent. 9 The court
based this conclusion on the facts that Interwest knew that its
equipment, following conversion, could not meet the Government's
performance specifications, and that Interwest had not sought
clarification of the Government's performance requirements. 21°
Consequently, Interwest did not meet its duty to inquire and
therefore, was not entitled to an equitable adjustment.261
In a persuasive dissent, Judge Pauline Newman found that the
contract was ambiguous, that the ambiguity was latent, and that
Interwest's interpretation was reasonable. 262  The difference in
opinion between Judge Newman and the majority stems from Judge
Newman's willingness to use extrinsic evidence to determine whether
the contract was ambiguous.2 Judge Newman believed that "'the
trade standards and practices of the relevant business community'
must be given weight when determining what bargain the parties
struck.2  Judge Newman was also willing to consider extrinsic
evidence to determine whether Interwest's interpretation was
reasonable.2  If it was reasonable, then the contract was ambiguous
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 1&
259. Id.
260. IM.
261. I& at 616.
262. I& at 616-18 (Newman, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 617 (NewmanJ., dissenting).
264. Id. (Newman,J, dissenting) (quoting Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d
622, 625 (Ct. Cl. 1978)).
265. See id. (examining trade practices, contemporaneous readings of specifications, and
other bidders' interpretations in determining ambiguity and/or reasonableness of interpretation
of contract).
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because it was capable of two different and reasonable interpretations,
each of which was consistent with the contract language.266
Judge Newman was persuaded by the fact that none of the other
bidders interpreted the solicitation in the same manner as the
Government267 and that it was questionable whether the Govern-
ment was requiring a significantly more expensive chiller "simply to
provide for the remote contingency of conversion. "2ta Consequent-
ly, Judge Newman found Interwest's interpretation to be both
reasonable and economical.269 In light of the interpretation of
other bidders, Judge Newman also found the contractual ambiguity
to be latent.
27 0
Certain prior decisions of the Federal Circuit support Judge
Newman's approach, allowing consideration of extrinsic evidence to
determine whether a contract is ambiguous,2  while other decisions
simply look to the four comers of the contract to satisfy this inqui-
ry.272  Still other decisions consider the mere fact that a dispute
exists to be evidence of ambiguity.
273
In Interwest, it seems clear that the majority's failure to consider
extrinsic evidence in determining whether the contract was ambigu-
ous led to an unfair result. Interwest was denied relief despite the
fact that all bidders interpreted the bid in the same manner as
266. See id. (Newman,J., dissenting) (noting that "all of the prospective subcontractors bid
in the same way" which was not consistent with Government's later interpretation of
specifications).
267. Id. (Newman,J., dissenting). AsJudge Newman pointed out, none of the other bidders
bid the more expensive equipment demanded by the Government. Id. (Newman,J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 618 (Newman,J, dissenting).
269. Id. (Newman,J, dissenting).
270. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hen those in the trade all read a
specification the same way and see no need to inquire, it is unwarranted for a court to decide
that an ambiguity, when it appears, is other than latent").
271. See Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (1993)
(considering interpretation of other bidders to determine whether specifications at issue were
ambiguous); see also Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding it proper to consider trade standards and practices of business community to determine
meaning of contract containing patent ambiguity, after court found contract to be patently
ambiguous as matter of law).
272. See Interstate Cent. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434-36 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (examining only language of contract but not extrinsic evidence). See also Halifax Eng'g
v. United States, No. 92-1121, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 23622, at *2-*3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 1991)
(examining only contract language); see also infra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing
various methods of contract interpretation).
273. SeeT.F. Powers Constr. Co. v. United States, 918 F.2d 187, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18065,
at *7 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 1990) (finding that ambiguity existed because both parties would agree
that contract was unambiguous and each was convinced of propriety of their position and
complete error of other party); United States v. Turner Constr. Co., 819 F.2d 283,283 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (finding contract to be ambiguous because if it were truly clear, dispute would not likely
have been "before this court").
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Interwest, and none of the bidders asked if their interpretation was
correct prior to contract award.7 4
B. Government Bad Faith
Accusing the Government of bad faith is one thing; proving it is
quite another. Federal courts presume that government officials act
in good faith when they perform their contractual duties.2 75 More-
over, the legal standard articulated by the Federal Circuit's predeces-
sor court, the Court of Claims, that "it takes, and should take, well-
nigh irrefragable proof'276 to overcome the presumption of good
faith, is as alive and well today as it was when the Court of Claims
coined that awkward phrase more than forty years ago. In A-Transport,
as discussed previously in terms of contract formation,277 the Federal
Circuit held that the contractor's "scant evidence" of the
Government's bad faith was insufficient to proceed to trial278 and
affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' grant of summary judgment to
the Government.2 9
A-Transport alleged that the Government had acted in bad faith by
revoking acceptance of its tenders for transportation services and
resoliciting new tenders, actions that caused A-Transport to lose five
carrier routes.2 80  A-Transport's evidence was the inconsistency
between the Government's assertion that it had the right to change
the terms of the tender agreement unilaterally, and the Government's
simultaneous decision to cancel and resolicit tenders because A-
Transport would not consent to the proposed changes.2 8 On this
basis, A-Transport alleged that the Government's resolicitation was
274. The Federal Circuit issued two other opinions during the 1994 term that support the
general principles of contract interpretation set forth in Intewest. SeeA-Transport Northwest Co.
v. United States, 36 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (looking only to language of contract
and stating that "when provisions in a contract are clear and fit the case, they should be given
their plain and ordinary meaning"); see also City ofTacoma v. United States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1134
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that clear contract provisions should be given their plain meaning and
that contract is ambiguous only when it supports more than one reasonable interpretation).
Moreover, both of these decisions support the majority's approach in Intenvest, i.e., excluding
extrinsic evidence when initially determining whether a contract is ambiguous. "[E]xtrinsic
evidence ... may not be considered unless an ambiguity is identified in the contract language."
Id.
275. SeeTorncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 771 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (stating that with respect
to government officials, good faith is presumed and only actions "motivated by a specific intent
to harm the plaintiff" will be prevented). See generally Toomey et al., supra note 89, at 91-95
(chronicling past decisions establishing presumption of good faith).
276. Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630, 681 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
277. See supra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
278. A-Transport, 36 F.Sd at 1585.
279. Id.
280. I. at 1578.
281. I&
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pretextual and that its real purpose was to eliminate A-Transport as
a contractor.
2 82
The Federal Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient to
overcome the presumption of good faith by the Government.
283
The court noted that there were alternative, reasonable explanations
for the Government's confused and somewhat inconsistent actions
and added that the Government ultimately selected A-Transport as
primary carrier for more routes than any other carrier, a fact that
"significantly undercuts A-Transport's theory.''21 A-Transport reaf-
firms that contractors who accuse the Government of acting in bad
faith bear an extremely heavy evidentiary burden. Without significant
evidence of government misconduct in hand, summary dismissal of
bad faith allegations should be expected.
C. Costing Government-Caused Delays
Contractors suffering compensable damages stemming from
government-caused performance delays have, over the years, sought
recovery of unabsorbed "home office overhead"285 based on a
myriad of calculation methods. 286  The Eichleay formula, which was
282. Id at 1579.
283. IX at 1585.
284. Id
285. Home office overhead expenses are those costs that are incurred by a contractor "for
the benefit of the business as a whole and which usually accrue over time." Wickham
Contracting Co. v. Fisher, 12 F.3d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Wickham Contracting Co.
v. GSA, GSBCA No. 8675,92-3 B.C.A. 1 25,040, at 124,818 (1992)). Home office overhead costs,
as opposed to those overhead expenses incurred by a construction contractor at ajob site, such
as field office equipment purchases, field supervisory and clerical salaries and payroll taxes,
cannot be specifically identified to any one contract. See id. at 1576 (describing assignment of
overhead expenses). Moreover, a contractor incurs home office overhead expenses even in the
event of a government imposed delay. Id. (acknowledging existence of unabsorbed overhead
costs but rejecting contractors claim for reimbursement of such costs) (citing Wckham, 92-3
B.CA (CCH), at 124,818 (1992)).
A contractor's entitlement to unallocated home office overhead costs resulting from
compensable delays at the hands of the Government was clearly established, at least in the
construction arena, fifty years ago in Fred R. Comb Co. v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 174, 183-84
(1945). Although the standard in determining entitlement to the same costs in the supply
context is not as clearly established, such costs are frequently included in the price adjustments
negotiated by the Government and approved by the boards of contract appeals. SeeAydin Corp.,
ASBCA No. 42,760,94-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,899, at 133,918,133,924 (1994) (upholding contract
that included specific terms for paying contractor's costs); CarteretWork Uniforms, 6 Cont. Cas.
Fed. (CCH), ASBCA No. 1647, 1 61,561, at 52,254 (1954).
286. See Bridgewater Constr. Corp., VABCA No. 2956, 91-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 24,272, at
121,345 (1991) (rejecting contractor's use of daily rate calculations method rather than Eichleay
formula); Stephenson Assocs., Inc., GSBCA No. 6573, 86-3 B.CA (CCH), 119,071, at 96,351
(1986) (discussing contractor's proposal to use "simulated work" formula); G.8. & L. Mechanical
Constr., DOT CAB No. 1640, 86-3 B.CA (CCH) 19,026, at 96,098 (1986) (refusing
contractor's use of "modified Eichleay formula").
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developed in 1960,287 is generally accepted, however, as the appro-
priate measure of such damages. Nevertheless, certain decisions by
the boards of contract appeals, as well as court holdings since 1978,
have cast some doubt upon the propriety of the Eichleay formula to
determine a contractor's recovery of unabsorbed home office
overhead expenses.2 Now, in Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer,2 9
the Federal Circuit has held that the Eichleay formula is the only
acceptable method of calculation of unabsorbed home office overhead
costs when the Eichleay requirements are satisfied.2 °
In Wickham, the Federal Circuit concluded that when a contractor
suffers compensable delay and is prevented from taking any additional
287. See Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 2688, at 13,574-76 (1960)
(computing overhead expenses during delay as product of daily overhead amount and agreed
length of delay), aff/d on reconsideration, 61-1 B.CA (CCH) 2894 (1960). Calculating
unabsorbed home office overhead using the Ei.hle.y formula entails the following three-step
process: (1) determination of overhead (indirect cost) by multiplying the "ratio of contract
billings to total billings for the actual contract period ... by total overhead for the contract
period;" (2) dividing the total number of days of actual contract performance into the allocable
overhead, which provides the "daily contract overhead;" and (3) multiplying the daily contract
overhead by the number of days of contract delay, the result being the unabsorbed overhead
amount. NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 50, at 153.
288. See Berley Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 385 N.E.2d 281, 284 (N.Y. 1978) (reversing
jury verdict granting unabsorbed overhead expenses calculated utilizing Eichleay formula and
criticizing use of formula because of"chance relationship" between damages derived from such
formula and actual damages); see also GuyJames Constr. Co. v. Trinity Indus., 644 F.2d 525, 533
(5th Cir.) (reversing lower court award based on Eichleay formula and holding that contractor
must prove incurrence of additional overhead costs resulting from government-caused delay in
order for contractor to recover damages), modified, 650 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1981); Capital Elec.
Co., GSBCA Nos. 5316, 5317, 83-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 16,548, at 82,314 (holding that unabsorbed
overhead cannot be measured accurately through use of Eichleay formula), rev'd, 729 F.2d 743
(Fed. Cir. 1983); Savoy Constr. Co. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 338,342 (1983) (affirming board's
denial of extended home office expense), revd, 732 F.2d 167 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
289. 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
290. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating
that Eichleay formula is "exclusive means" for determining contractor's compensation). Wicham
is the latest of five recent decisions by the Federal Circuit addressing the calculation of
unabsorbed home office expense. See Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
12 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (adopting utilization of Eicheay formula as applied in
previous cases); Daly Constr., Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520, 522 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding
utilization of EichLeay formula when contractor meets requirements); Capital Elec. Co. v. United
States, 729 F.2d 743, 746-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (approving use of Eichleay formula to calculate
unabsorbed home office overhead expenses as accurate and well-established method of
determiningjudgments). But see Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (restricting use of Eichieay formula to cases where contractor can
demonstrate that delay prevented contractor from accepting otherjobs and where Government
can show that contractor would suffer no loss by using fixed percentage mark up formula);
C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (refusing to expand
Eihleay formula by requiring "element of uncertainty before formula can be used to calculate
extended home office overhead").
To invoke the Eichleay formula, it must be shown that: (1) the contractor has suffered a
compensable delay, and (2) it is impossible to assess the amount of unabsorbed home office
overhead directly attributable to a specific contract and resulting from the delay. WiMham, 12
F.3d at 1577.
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work during the delay to mitigate its unabsorbed costs, the formula
is the "exclusive means available for calculating unabsorbed overhead
to the delayed contract."291' The court stated that where the amount
of unabsorbed home office overhead expense specifically caused by
the delay of a project cannot be determined, utilization of a daily rate
of overhead expense as required by the "Eichleay formula fairly
distributes" such expense.292 The Wickham court further stated that
unabsorbed overhead expense cannot contain any costs that are
directly attributable to a particular project, including the delayed
project,29 3 and that home office overhead expenses, by their very
nature, cannot be traced to a particular job.2 94
In its claim for additional unabsorbed home office overhead
expenses, over and above that awarded previously by the contracting
officer based on the Eichleay formula, Wickham, a construction
contractor, argued that eighty percent of its home office overhead
costs were "directly attributable to" or caused by the delayed contract
because eighty percent of the home office activity was in support of
the delayed contract295 Therefore, Wickham argued that the
Eichleay formula, which distributes unabsorbed home office overhead
expense on a pro-rata share among all of the contracts, resulted in
too little of such costs being absorbed by the delayed contract.296
The Federal Circuit, affirming the decision of the GSBCA, denied the
contractor's claim and found that the contractor had confused direct
costs with home office overhead expenses, which are incurred
regardless of what jobs are undertaken by a contractor. 97 In cases
291. Wkduzm, 12 F.3d at 1580.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1581.
294. 1L at 1579.
295. itL at 1578.
296. XL
297. L at 1580-81. The Federal Circuit in Wickham also held that the contractor did not
meet its burden of proof to establish that the contractor would have finished early absent a
government-caused delay that resulted in a larger negotiated amount of unabsorbed overhead.
L at 1582. In addition, the court affirmed the Board of Contract Appeals' decision and did not
allow the contractor to recover interest on equity capital that, according to the contractor, was
borrowed and used to finance additional costs caused by the Government's delays. Id. The
court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1988) generally prohibits the award of interest except
where specifically legislated by Congress. AL at 1582-83. Finally, the court held that although
interest paid on monies borrowed to cover additional expenses caused by a government delay
are recoverable, in this case, the contractor failed to prove that any of the funds borrowed by
the company during the relevant time period were actually utilized on this particular
government contract. Id. at 1583.
The Federal Circuit rejected the "jury verdict" method of calculating the amount of a
contractor's unabsorbed home office expense as improper. Id. at 1580. Under this method,
the facts and circumstances surrounding a government-caused delay are considered to determine
the appropriate amount of compensation for unabsorbed overhead. See Miles Constr., VABCA
No. 1674, 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 16,967, at 84,375 (1983) (utilizing jury verdict" method in
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subsequent to Wickham, the courts and boards of contract appeals
continue to refine and restate the criteria for use of the Eichleay
formula to compute unabsorbed home office overhead expense. 298
Although Wickham answers the question of which method of
calculation of unabsorbed home office overhead expenses is proper
when a construction contractor meets the Eichleay criteria, several
unanswered questions remain. What is the preferred method to be
utilized when these criteria are not met by a construction contractor?
Can a contractor simply choose the most advantageous method?
What method should be utilized when appropriate and necessary
financial records have not been kept by the contractor? Is it more
appropriate, in such situations, to deny the contractor's claim? What
is the correct method to calculate unabsorbed home office overhead
in the supply context where some commentators have suggested that
utilization of the Eichleay formula is like fitting a "square peg in a
round hole?"219  What of the well-established principle that unab-
sorbed overhead expenses cannot be recovered in termination for
convenience settlements despite the fact that such costs exist due to
the reduction in direct labor dollars? And, finally, will the practice of
allowing such costs in the delay context in any way affect the well-
accepted prohibition on reimbursing such costs in termination
situations?
D. Product Liability Issues
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., ° contractors have invoked the "government contractor
defense" to shield themselves from third party liability arising in
connection with government contract performance301 Contractors
finding "reasonable determination" of excess costs).
298. See Eurostyle, Inc. v. GSA, GSBCA No. 12,084, 94-2 B.CA (CCH) 26,891, at 133,857
(1994) (stating that Eichleay formula is not appropriate where contractor suffered no decrease
in direct labor costs as result of extension of contract performance, and concluding that
contractor suffered no compensable delay as required by Eichleay formula).
299. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Unabsorbed Overhead on Supply Contracts: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 45, at 114 (1994).
300. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
301. The "government contractor defense" has played a substantive role in twenty separate
opinions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See generally Landgrafv. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., 993 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 553 (1993); Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991
F.2d 1117 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 191 (1993); Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d
83 (2d Cir.), cert. deni,, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971
F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992); Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641 (11th Cir. 1992); In reHawaii
Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992); Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331 (5th
Cir.), crt. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991); Mitchell v. Lone StarAmmunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242 (5th
Cir. 1990); Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1990); Dorse v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 898 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1990); In rejoint E. & S. Dist. New York Asbestos
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meeting established criteria may not be held liable under state law for
design defects in products developed in accordance with "reasonably
precise specifications" provided to the contractor by the Govern-
ment. 0 2  This extension of the Government's immunity can effec-
tively shield contractors from tremendous liability.
In Hercules Inc. v. United States,3" 3 however, the Government,
instead of the contractor, relied on this defense to shield itself from
such liability. In Hercules, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Court of Federal Claims, granting summary judgment in favor of
the Government and denying the requests of two manufacturers of
Agent Orange for government indemnification.
304
The manufacturers, Hercules Inc. (Hercules) and Win. T. Thomp-
son Co. (Thompson), sought recovery of sums that each had
contributed to a fund established in connection with the 1984
settlement of a class action suit brought by Vietnam veterans and their
families for injuries and death caused by the Government's use of
Agent Orange in the Vietnam War."3  Hercules and Thompson
Litig., 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990); Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450
(9th Cir. 1990); Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 953 (1990); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.
1989), rert. denieA 494 U.S. 1030 (1990); Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir. 1989); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989); Trevino v. General Dynamics
Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d
629 (5th Cir. 1989); Lopez v. A.C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988), r-ert. denied, 491 U.S.
904 (1989); McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1988).
302. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (setting forth test
determining when liability cannot be imposed). The Court decided that state law regarding
military design defects cannot be imposed where "(1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States." Id. at 512.
303. 24 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), petitionforcert.filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1994)
(No. 90-391c). On April 3, 1995, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. Hercules,
Inc. v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1425 (1995). ED.
304. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 204 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim that
Government was required to indemnify Agent Orange contractors), petition for cert. fied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1994) (No. 90-391c).
305. Id. at 202. Prior to the 1984 settlement, in a 1982 hearing, the district court stated that
the manufacturers would be entitled to summary judgment based on the government contractor
defense if they could prove that: (1) the Government had established the specifications for the
chemical; (2) the chemical produced by the manufacturers met the Governments specifications;
and (3) the Government knew as much or more than the manufacturers about the hazards
presented to humans by the chemical. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp.
1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). After finding that the chemical manufacturers met all of these
criteria, the district court thereafter granted summary judgment. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1278 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The summary judgment entered in favor
of the manufacturers was reconsidered, however, by a different judge to whom the case was
transferred prior to the entry of ajudgment of dismissal. See Hercules, 24 F.3d at 192 (discussing
procedural history of Agent Orange litigation) (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
597 F. Supp. 740, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). This judge denied the manufacturers' motions for
summary judgment, and thus effectively reversed the prior decision. In re "Agent Orange", 597
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sought settlement costs and litigation expenses from the Government
under a number of theories, all of which were based on the
Government's breach of various implied contractual warranties to
them, resulting in increased costs for the manufacturers.3 06
1. Implied warranty of specifications
Both manufacturers argued that the Government had breached an
implied contractual obligation to establish manufacturing specifica-
tions sufficient to ensure that Agent Orange, if produced in accor-
dance with such specifications, would be safe for its unprecedented
yet intended use.307 Under this theory, the court stated that the
manufacturers must prove, as in all breach of warranty actions, that
a valid warranty existed, that the warranty was breached, and that the
damages sought were caused by the breach."0 8
The court denied the relief sought by the manufacturers.3 09
Relying on earlier decisions by the district court finding that the
government contractor defense applied to shield Hercules and
Thompson from liability,30 the Federal Circuit stated that both
manufacturers were immune from the veterans' claims.' If the
manufacturers had not settled and had gone to trial, 12 this defense
would have protected them from any liability."  The court rea-
soned, therefore, that the damages sought by the contractors were not
caused by defective Government specifications, but instead by the
voluntary settlement action taken by the manufacturers."'
F. Supp. at 753. On the day that trial was to begin, the manufacturers settled, establishing the
fund for the class defendants. Hercules, 24 F.3d at 192.
306. See generally In re "Agent Orange," 534 F. Supp. at 1054-56 (discussing government
contract defense). Cases dealing with product liability and contractor indemnification by the
Government are fairly unique to the Federal Circuit. Very few cases decided by the Federal
Circuit set forth the bases upon which a contractor may obtain indemnification from the
Government for damages that the contractor incurs as a result of its performance of a
government contract. See also Lopez v. A.C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
491 U.S. 904 (1989).
307. Hercules, 24 F.3d at 197 (stating manufacturers' claims). The manufacturers relied on
United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) and its progeny. Id. In Spearin, the court held
that where the Government provides detailed specifications to a contractor, it warrants to that
contractor that a product produced in accordance with such specifications will not be defective.
Id. (citing United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1918)). If the product is nevertheless
actually defective or unsafe, the contractor will not be liable to third parties. Id.
308. Id.
309. I. at 199.
310. See id. at 200 (citing In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1273-74
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), and In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
311. Id.
312. See id. (stating that if case had proceeded to trial, it was highly unlikely that any liability
would have been imposed on manufacturers).
313. Id.
314. Id.
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As pointed out by the dissent, the government contractor defense
was still evolving when the contractors entered into the settlement of
the Agent Orange litigation in 1984.' Indeed, the settlement of
this litigation was finalized some four years prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Boyle. 16 The dissent, therefore, found the
majority's holding that the "evolving" government contractor defense
would "clearly dictate the outcome" in the original suits to be
unpersuasive. 17
Moreover, the dissent also noted that.the district -court judge to
whom the case was transferred and who reconsidered the motion for
summaryjudgment in the original Agent Orange litigation "must have
believed that there was a valid on-going case or controversy"318 even
in light of the government contractor defense. Otherwise, the court
would have left standing the earlier grant of the summary judgment
motion, instead of effectively reversing it.319
2. Implied reverse warranty
The Government had refused to allow Hercules to attach their
customary warning labels to the barrels of Agent Orange delivered to
the military.320 Hercules, therefore, argued that the Government
had impliedly warranted that it would not utilize Agent Orange in any
manner that would subject military personnel to increased risk or
Hercules to subsequent tort actions. 2 Once again, the court held
that, in view of the valid government contractor defense, Hercules
could not prove that the Government's alleged breach of the reverse
warranty caused the settlement costs or litigation expenses.322
3. Implied warranty of superior knowledge and implied obligation to
indemnify
Both manufacturers also argued that the Government breached an
implied contractual obligation to: (1) inform each manufacturer of
the superior knowledge possessed by the Government of the dangers
of dioxin, a chemical contained in Agent Orange;32 and (2) to
315. Ud at 207 (Player, J., dissenting).
316. See idU at 206 (PlayerJ., dissenting) (challenging majority's use of Boyle in determining
liability).
317. ML at 207 (Playerj., dissenting).
318. L at 206 (PlayerJ., dissenting).
319. 1d. (PlayerJ, dissenting).
320. UL at 200.
321. M at 201.
322. XL at 202.
323. AL at 196-97. If the Government fails to provide a contractor with "vital knowledge"
which is known by the Government and which affects the costs incurred or the time required
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indemnify them in accordance with the Defense Production Act
pursuant to which both companies were compelled by law to produce
Agent Orange. 24 The Federal Circuit denied relief under both
theories.s
Despite the multitude of arguments offered, the manufacturers
were unable to pass any of the costs or expenses that they incurred in
the settlement with the Vietnam veterans and their families onto the
Government.3 26 The contractors failed to obtain any assistance from
the Government despite the fact that the Government had required
the companies to perform, and indeed, had provided the formula and
specifications that dictated, to some extent, how the chemical was to
be prepared. 327 Because the companies failed to avail themselves of
a defense that they were unsure would prevail at the time-the
government contractor defense-the Federal Circuit denied relief to
the manufacturers.
This denial of relief for failure to raise the government contractor
defense is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, the court did
not independently analyze the test articulated and refined by the
Supreme Court in Boyle to determine whether the government
contractor defense truly should apply to shield Hercules and
Thompson. Instead, the Federal Circuit relied on earlier Second
Circuit holdings decided prior to Boyle to find that the government
contractor defense applied. 28
This is significant because in Boyle, the Supreme Court refined the
three-part government contractor defense test and made it clear that
such a defense will only be available to contractors to whom the
to perform, the Government may be liable for breach damages. l. at 196.
324. I at 202 (citing Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (a) (1964)).
325. L at 197. The court was unwilling to extend the doctrine of superior knowledge to
cover costs that it believed were incurred "post-performance," such as settlement and litigation
expenses. Id. Concerning the manufacturers' claim that the Government was required to
indemnify them under the Defense Production Act, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision and held that the Act authorized the President to dictate that performance of
government contracts entered into pursuant to the Act would be given preference over all other
contracts. Id. at 203. The court therefore held that the Defense Production Act provided
protection only against the risk that it created-that another commercial customer might sue
a government contractor for breach resulting from the preference given to the military contract.
Id.
326. 1d. at 204 (refusing to allow companies to recover costs for Agent Orange litigation).
327. Id. at 191 (noting that Government supplied company with chemical specifications).
See also id at 203 (recognizing that Government can compel contract acceptance and
performance).
328. See Hercu/k, 24 F.3d at 193 (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), to justify court's reliance on
government contractor defense); see also iai. (citing In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), in support of court's acceptance of government contractor defense).
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Government has provided design specifications.'2 In Boyle, the Court
stated that the contractor will not be liable for "design defects" if,
among other things, the Government "approved reasonably precise
specifications."3 S
Prior to Boyle, however, the criteria for application of the defense
stated that a contractor might be shielded from liability if the
Government had "established the specifications for 'Agent Or-
ange.'" 31 This criterion does not seem to draw any distinction
between "design specifications" and "performance specifications."
By relying on prior holdings that the government contractor
defense would have protected the manufacturers from all liability,
without applying the newer standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Boyle, the Federal Circuit in Hercules appears to have ratified
an earlier, outdated test that did not differentiate between design and
performance specifications.
It is unclear whether the manufacturers of Agent Orange were
given design or performance specifications, although they were given
a formula and specifications in order to manufacture Agent Or-
ange. 32 If these specifications did not rise to the level of design
specifications, but were instead performance specifications, the
Federal Circuit's reliance on the government contractor defense to
dispose of the manufacturer's arguments as to implied warranty of
specifications and reverse warranty was clearly misplaced. This
reliance, in turn, may have led to an incorrect analysis and outcome
in this case. 33
The second interesting aspect of Hercules is whether subsequent
courts will interpret the holding narrowly or broadly. Hercules may be
cited in subsequent case law for the broad proposition that the
Government will simply not indemnify a contractor if that contractor
could have relied on, but instead waived, the government contractor
defense. Only time will determine if contractors must, in the future,
329. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500,512 (1988) (enumerating three-part
test for determining whether manufacturer is liable).
330. ML
331. Hercues, 24 F.3d at 192.
332. Id. at 191 (stating that military "supplied the formula and specifications for manufactur-
ing Agent Orange").
333. The Second Circuit has stated that its decisions finding that the government contractor
defense applied to the Agent Orange manufacturers fiiled to require that the "government
specifications be 'reasonably precise.'" In reJoint E. & S. Dist. New York Asbestos Litig. v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 626, 635 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1987)). This failure limits the value of the Second Circuit's
decisions because of the court's failure to require "the more exacting standard a military
contractor must satisfy after Boyke to establish the military contractor defense." Id.
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guess as to whether they should assert the government contractor
defense.
After Hercules, contractors cannot be certain whether or not
appellate courts will prevent them from passing on damages to the
Government if they opt for settlement instead of pursuing a viable
government contractor defense at trial. Such a result would seeming-
ly dictate trial in lieu of settlement in cases where it is simply too
difficult to determine if the government contractor defense applies.
E. Value Engineering Change Proposals
The purpose of the "value engineering change" clause contained in
most contracts is to motivate contractors to develop and propose ideas
to the Government that the contractor believes will reduce the overall
cost of contract performance without affecting the essential require-
ments dictated by the Government's specifications. Recent decisions
by the Federal Circuit, however, have all but eliminated any incentive
that the clause may provide to contractors to expend the effort and
funds necessary to develop and propose such cost-saving ideas.
In the most recent of such cases, M. Bianchi of California v.
Perry," the Federal Circuit held that absent an initial bad faith
rejection of a value engineering change proposal (VECP) by the
Government, a contractor is not entitled to share in the cost savings
recognized by the Government.335 The contractor is denied any
benefit resulting from the cost savings even though the Government
subsequently incorporates the idea contained in the VECP into
another contract 3 6
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) awarded M. Bianchi of
California (MBOC) a contract to manufacture military garments. 37
MBOC was to package these garments in boxes of five each. 3 s
Realizing that savings could be achieved by packaging additional
quantities of garments in each box, MBOC submitted two separate
VECPs proposing that the individual box size be increased to hold
additional quantities of the garments.3 3 9
334. 31 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
335. M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, 31 F.3d 1163, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that
contractor should be entitled to share of government savings based on lack of privity between
government and contractor at time of rejection of VEOP).
336. IdL
337. 1& at 1164.
338. 1 at 1165.
339. I&
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Initially, the DLA rejected both proposals.' Following the
rejection of its VECPs, MBOC completed performance of its con-
tract."4 Once the MBOC contract expired, the DLA modified the
contract of another vendor, VI-MIL, for the manufacture of military
garments to incorporate .the VECP idea originally proposed by
MBOC.342
MBOC, alleging that DLA constructively accepted its idea by
incorporating the VECP in the VI-MIL contract, submitted claims for
royalties stemming from the cost savings to be recognized in the
performance of the VI-MIL contract as well as other future and
concurrent contracts for "essentially the same" item.341 In hearings
conducted by the ASBCA, the Government's counsel conceded that
MBOC's ideas were utilized in other DLA contracts.' 4 Moreover,
the Government's counsel conceded that DLA had "constructively
accepted" MBOC's VECP through the incorporation of this idea in
subsequent DLA contracts 45
Despite these concessions, the ASBCA denied MBOC any royal-
ties. 46 The ASBCA, relying on John J Kirlin, Inc. v. United States,'M 7
held that MBOC's contractual relationship with the Government had
ended prior to the incorporation of the VECP into VI-MIL's con-
tract.s  Therefore, there existed no express or implied basis for
any recovery by MBOC. 49  In other words, the Government's
express or constructive acceptance of a VECP must occur prior to the
expiration or termination of the contractual relationship between the
Government and the contractor proposing the VECP. 5 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's holding.351 The court stated
that there must be an express contractual relationship on which to
base the recovery of royalties stemming from the incorporation of a
VECP in concurrent or future contracts 52
340. 1d.
341. Id.
342. 1d at 1166.
343. I1.
344. 1d.
345. Id.
346. M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, ASBCA Nos. 37,029, 37,071, 93-1 B.CA. (CCH) 25,309,
at 126,089-90 (1992).
347. 827 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
348. Bianchi, 93-1 B.CA (CCH), at 126,089.
349. Id. at 126,090.
350. I& at 126,089.
351. M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, 31 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
352. Id.
2157
THE AMERJCAN UN1VERSITY LAW REW [Vol. 44:2115
In John J. Kirlin, Inc. v. United States,"'5 the Federal Circuit faced
essentially the same facts. In Kirlin, a contractor alleged that the
Government, although it initially rejected the contractor's VECP,
ultimately incorporated an idea from the VECP into another
contractor's contract after the contract under which the VECP
originally had been proposed expired." 4  The Federal Circuit
acknowledged the doctrine of constructive acceptance of a VECP by
the Government, following the Government's initial rejection of the
VECP.355 The court, however, stated that this doctrine was a basis
for recovery only when the alleged constructive acceptance occurred
under the same contract that contained the proposed VECP.3 56
The court in Kirlin stated that a contractor's right to recovery of
royalties depended on an express contractual relationship.357 Once
the contract ended, there was generally considered to be no basis for
recovery." s  The court acknowledged, however, that should a
contractor be able to prove a bad faith rejection of the idea by the
Government, recovery could possibly be obtained.359 In addition,
the Federal Circuit seemed to leave open the possibility that, had facts
been present to support an implied contractual relationship, the court
could have granted recovery to the originator of the idea based on
constructive acceptance by the Government pursuant to an implied
contract.360
In Bianchi, however, the Federal Circuit seems to have eliminated
any such possibility. The court, in Bianchi, stated that constructive
acceptance of a VECP is simply precluded following contract
expiration361 because, once the contract has ended, there is no
privity between the contractor and the Government on which a
contractual right can be based. 62 In so holding, the court appar-
ently ignored the plain language of the VECP clause which states that
"[t]he Contracting Officer may accept, in whole or in part, by
contract modification either before or within a reasonable time after
353. 827 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
354. JohnJ. Kirlin, Inc. v. United States, 827 F.2d 1538, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
355. kIL at 1541 (recognizing that "at least one board of contract appeals" has upheld
doctrine of constructive acceptance).
356. Md (rejecting claim that contractor should be awarded compensation on basis of
"subsequent contract to which [contractor] was not a party").
357. 1&
358. IM.
359. IM.
360. I&
361. M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, 31 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
362. lMt
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performance has been completed under this contract any VECP
submitted pursuant to this clause."' 63
The court stated, however, that its holding that a VECP must be
expressly or constructively accepted prior to completion of the
contract under which the VECP was offered does not conflict with the
plain words of the VECP clause because the Government had formally
rejected the VECP proposed by MBOC. The court apparently
viewed this act of formal rejection as cutting off the right MBOC
might otherwise have had pursuant to the clause to claim royalties
from a VECP acceptance following contract completion. The court
stated that, at most, the words of the VECP clause only allowed
acceptance following contract completion so long as the Government
had not acted prior to contract completion."s
This reasoning seems to be in conflict with the basis on which the
case was decided. Recovery of damages was denied because the
contract was complete so that there was no privity of contract between
MBOC and the Government and therefore, no basis upon which to
base any contractual recovery."s The lack of privity relied upon by
the court to deny relief to MBOC was effected by the completion of
contract performance and not Government rejection. 6 Action or
inaction on the part of the Government with regard to the VECP had
no effect on contract privity." Therefore, whether acceptance
occurred following an initial rejection or simply inaction should be of
no consequence. Acceptance of an idea after an initial rejection is no
less an acceptance than if the idea had not been initially rejected. To
be consistent with the court's lack-of-privity holding, it should only
matter whether express or constructive acceptance occurred prior to
contract completion.
Moreover, the court's theory that there existed no contractual basis
to support recovery also seems flawed. By its very terms, the VECP
clause survived termination or expiration of the contract for at least
363. IL at 1164. Indeed, the court seems to have failed to follow its own holdings that an
ambiguity will not be read into a contract where the words are clear and susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation. See, eg., A-Transport Northwest Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1576,
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (adhering to "plain and ordinary meaning" interpretation of contract);
City of Tacoma v. United States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that contract clause
was "not inherently ambiguous" because it was subject to "only one reasonable interpretation");
Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding specific language of
contract as unambiguous).
364. Bianchi, 31 F.3d at 1168.
365. I/ (interpreting VECP clause only to permit government to accept VECP after contract
period which it had not previously acted).
366. Id
367. 1&
368. I.
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a reasonable period of time. 69 The clause expressly governed
acceptance by the Government after contract completion.7 0
Indeed, the survival of the clause was not conditioned on the
Government's failure to reject prior to award. The clause survived
and required the payment of royalties so long as the VECP was
accepted within a reasonable period of time following contract
completion. 7'
In addition to holding that there must be contractual privity to
allow constructive acceptance, the court held that the submission of
a VECP does not "confer any proprietary right in the 'concept' of the
proposal."3 72  Thus, the holding in Bianchi clearly opens the door
for the Government to initially reject VECP ideas, wait until contract
completion, and then utilize a contractor's VECP with no obligation
to compensate the contractor. The Government can, of course, offer
contractors a false sense of security by asserting that it is only
permitted to reject in good faith.373 The difficulties in attempting
to prove bad faith on the part of the Government mean, however,
that contractors will gain very little comfort from this assurance.
Without any comfort that they will be treated fairly, and because their
ideas may not be accepted or compensated, it is doubtful that many
contractors will be rushing forward with cost-saving ideas. 74
F Cost Accounting Standards
Contracts subject to the Cost Accounting Standards (GAS) require
contractor compliance with these standards, written disclosure, and
consistent adherence to disclosed cost accounting practices.37 5 Such
contracts also require contractors to notify their Administrative
369. Seei. at 1165.
370. I(L (reprinting VECP clause which allowed for acceptance ofany VECP by Government
"within a reasonable time after performance has been completed under [the] contract").
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. See id. at 1167 (noting that VECP was denied in good faith).
374. Perhaps a more equitable position would be that if the Government initially rejected
a VECP in bad faith but later constructively accepts the idea through its incorporation into
another contract, the contractor should be entitled to royalties. The fact that the contract has
been completed or that a reasonable period of time has elapsed should have no bearing on the
contractor's recovery.
Moreover, even absent bad faith, the clear words of the contract's value engineering clause
should be followed. The contractor should receive royalties if the Government expressly or
constructively accepts the VEOP during contract performance or during a reasonable period of
time thereafter, even if the Government initially rejected the idea in good faith.
375. See 41 U.S.C. § 422 (1994) (establishing cost accounting standards board); 48 C.FR. §
52.230-2(a) (2) (1994) (establishing cost accounting standards); 48 .F.R. § 52.230-3(a) (3) (i)
(1994) (requiring contractor to consistently follow its cost accounting practices); 48 C.FR. §
52.230-4 (1994) (requiring consistency in cost accounting standards).
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Contracting Officer (ACO) and to submit a description of any
voluntary change in their disclosed accounting practices at least sixty
days in advance of implementing such changes.376
Where a contractor fails to disclose a change in accounting practice,
it risks unilateral withholding by the Government on all of its GAS-
covered contracts.377 In addition, the contractor faces a unilateral
price adjustment of such contracts if the costs paid by the Govern-
ment materially increase under the new, undisclosed accounting
practice.37 Moreover, it is generally accepted that the correct
measure of withholding and unilateral price adjustment to CAS-
covered contracts equals the costs paid by the Government under the
new, undisclosed accounting practice, over and above the costs that
would have been paid by the Government under the previously
disclosed practice.7 ' Although FAR and its predecessor regulations
support this calculation, they fail to address whether the previously
disclosed accounting method is to be utilized to determine the correct
amount to be paid by the Government, when such previously
disclosed practice is non-compliant.
In General Motors Corp. v. Aspin,"0 the Federal Circuit recently
answered this question. The Federal Circuit held that the increased
cost paid by the Government should be the difference between the
costs that General Motors allocated to the Government under a new,
undisclosed practice and the costs that would have been paid by the
Government under the previously disclosed accounting practice,
regardless of whether the disclosed practice was compliant.u 1
In 1975, General Motors submitted a revision to its disclosure
statement, setting forth a change in the manner in which it directly
allocated an Indiana state corporate income tax to one of its
individual business segments in accordance with CAS 4 0 3 .2 The
376. See 48 C.F.R. § 30.602-3(b)(2) (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-2(a)(2) (1994); 48 G.F.R. §
52.230-5(a) (2) (1994) (setting forth contracting requirements).
377. See 48 C.F.R. § 30.602-3 (d) (1) (1994) (providing remedial procedures where contractor
does not submit accounting change description, dollar magnitude of change, or cost impact
proposal as required); 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-5 (c) (1994) (specifying amount entitled to be withheld
by contracting officer where contractor deficient in filing required cost impact proposals or cost
accounting changes).
378. 48 C.F.R. § 30.602-3(d)(2) (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-2(a)(5) (1994); 48 C.F.R. §
52.230-3 (a) (4) (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-4 (1994); see also Perry v. Martin Marietta Corp., 47
F.3d 1134, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (contending that internal corporate reorganization could result
in adjustment to some CAS-covered contracts).
379. Peny, 47 F.3d at 1135.
380. 24 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
381. General Motors Corp. v. Aspin, 24 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
382. l. at 1379-80. CAS 403 requires contractors to allocate home office expense to
particular business segments to the maximum extent possible based upon a beneficial and causal
relationship. I. at 1380-81; see also United States v. Lockheed Corp., 817 F.2d 1565, 1569-70
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Government, found the proposed "composite rate method" to be
unacceptable.M
Following the Government's rejection, General Motors did not
reinstitute the "pre-1974 method,"' the method previously utilized
by General Motors. Instead, it instituted a new method, the
"1975-1979 method," but it never disclosed this change to the
Government.' Under the 1975-1979 method, General Motors
allocated more taxes to the Government than it would have under the
pre-1974 method. 8 In 1984, the ACO rendered its final decisions,
holding that General Motors overallocated Indiana state income tax
under the 1975-1979 method in violation of CAS 403.s
General Motors appealed this decision to the ASBCA. "  On
appeal, the Government argued that it was entitled to a downward
price adjustment, not only because the 1975-1979 method of
allocation utilized by General Motors overallocated Indiana state tax
to the Government, but also because General Motors violated its CAS
disclosure obligations. 9  The ASBCA agreed with the Govern-
ment.3 ° Additionally, the ASBCA found that the pre-1974 method
complied with CAS 403."'1
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that GAS 403 requires direct
allocation of home office expenses that can be specifically identified
with a business segment, reversing the ASBCA's decision on this
point. 92 The court also disagreed with the ASBCA regarding its
conclusion that the pre-1974 method of allocation of Indiana state
income taxes complied with CAS 403 while a newer "claim" method
of allocation, which was first put forth by General Motors in its
ASBCA appeal, did not. 93 The Federal Circuit found that only the
"claim" method correctly allocated the state income tax.3 4  The
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring traceable relationship between expense and segment); Boeing Co.
v. United States, 680 F.2d 132, 135 (Ct. CL 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983) (recognizing
CAS 403 provision requiring direct allocation of costs to segments).
383. General Motors, 24 F.3d at 1380.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. I&
389. I. CAS 403 requires contractors to disclose any change in cost accounting methods.
4 C.F.R. § 403 (1994). General Motors violated this requirement by not disclosing to the
Government its change to the "1975-1979" method of cost accounting. General Motors, 24 F.3d
at 1380.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1381-82.
393. Id. at 1383.
394. Id.
2162
1995] 1994 AREA SuMMARY: GOVERNMENT CoNTRAcTs
Federal Circuit, however, did affirm the ASBCA's finding that the
contractor violated its disclosure obligation when it changed the
manner in which it allocated Indiana state income taxes. 95
Despite its finding that the pre-1974 allocation method was non-
compliant, the court held that the proper remedy for the contractor's
failure to disclose a voluntary change in allocation methods was the
difference between the higher costs paid by the Government under
the non-compliant allocation method instituted by the contractor
without disclosure and the non-compliant pre-1974 method. 96
Notwithstanding this holding's effective reinstatement of the non-
compliant pre-1974 method of allocation, the court stated that the
proper remedy for the contractor's failure to disclose was not
reinstatement of a non-compliant method of allocation. 97 This is,
however, exactly what the Federal Circuit effectively accomplished.
The measure of damages advocated by the Federal Circuit was the
same measure advocated by the ASBCA.98 It is important to note,
however, that the ASBCA found the pre-1974 method of allocation to
be the only compliant method discussed in the ASBCA case." The
ASBCA did not, therefore, effectively re-institute a non-compliant
method of allocation through its calculation of damages. Instead, it
re-instituted what it believed to be the only compliant method.4'
The Federal Circuit's reliance on a non-compliant allocation
method as the appropriate measure of damages for failure to disclose
raises many questions concerning the calculation of such damages in
future cases. How will the Federal Circuit calculate damages in a
situation where a contractor changes from a previously disclosed non-
compliant method to an undisclosed compliant method, resulting in
an increase in allocation clearly allowed under CAS? Will the Federal
Circuit effectively re-institute a non-compliant method over a
395. IL
396. I- The court relied upon the CAS clause contained in the relevant contract, which
stated that a contractor "[a~gree[d] to an adjustment of the contract price or cost allowance,
as appropriate," in the event that the contractor "fail[ed] to comply with an applicable Cost
Accounting Standard[] or to follow any practice disclosed.., and such failure result[s] in any
increased costs paid by the United States." I& General Motors failed to disclose its change in
accounting practice from one non-compliant method to another non-compliant method, and
such change increased the costs allocated to the Government. Id.
397. I&
398. See id. (discussing proper method for measuring damages in cases where contractors fail
to disclose properly changes in cost accounting procedures).
399. SeeGeneral Motors Corp., ASBCA Nos. 30510,31226, 31482,36118,93-2 B.C. (CCH)
1 25,753, at 128,150-52 (1993).
400. It Moreover, Federal Circuit Judge Helen Nies, concurring in part in the majority
opinion, pointed out that the majority need not have remanded the case for determination of
damages because the damages calculated by the court and the ASBCA were the same. General
Motors, 24 F.3d at 1384.
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compliant method and seek damages when in fact, no real damages
have occurred because the contractor allocated costs in accordance
with CAS? Preferably, such valuing of form over substance will end
before a contractor is required to provide such a "remedy."
G. Contract Financing
During the last thirty years, the Federal Circuit has rarely consid-
ered issues relating to the Assignment of Claims Act.4"' In fact,
since 1960, the court has ruled on only two Assignment of Claims Act
cases.4" 2 In 1984, the Federal Circuit in Security Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States,403 held that the Government's failure to give an
assignee notice of the termination of the assigned contract did not
render the Government liable to the assignee for the amounts loaned
to the contractor.' The following year, the Federal Circuit, in
Unity Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,4 °5 held that an assignee's
claims did not take priority over the claims of the contractor's
employees under the Davis-Bacon Act406 where the contractor failed
to pay its employees the prevailing wage.407
In Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. United
States,' the Federal Circuit again considered the priority of an
assignee's claims under the Assignment of Claims Act. The court held
that the assignee had priority over the Small Business Administration
(SBA) 4° and, therefore, could recover from the Government
amounts that the Government had paid to the contractor under a
settlement agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the assignee had
collected from the SBA amounts owed the assignee under two SBA
guaranteed loans."'
401. 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988). Under the Assignment of Claims Act, a contractor may assign
to a bank, trust company, or other financing institution moneys due or to become due under
a government contract as security for a loan to the contractor. FAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ 32.801, at
32.802. The purpose of the Assignment of Claims Act is to promote private financing of
government contracts while still protecting the interests of the government. SeegenerallyVickery
& Paalborg, Assignment of Claims Act, 87-3 Briefing Papers (Feb. 1987). The Anti-Claims Act
and the Anti-Assignment Act, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), are customarily referred to as the
Assignment of Claims Act.
402. See infra notes 403-07 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving Assignment of
Claims Act).
403. 731 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
404. Security Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 731 F.2d 861, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
405. 756 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
406. 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1988).
407. Unity Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 756 F.2d 870, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
that employees are beneficiaries of Davis-Bacon Act).
408. 23 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
409. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 23 F.3d 380,385 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
410. Id
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The contractor in Bank of America had entered into a security
agreement with a bank and granted the bank a security interest in the
proceeds of a series of government contracts.4  In accordance with
the Assignment of Claims Act, the bank notified the Government of
the assignment. 12 The Government acknowledged and accepted
the assignment and made payments under the contracts directly to
the bank i.41 The contractor subsequently sought and received an SBA
guarantee on two additional loans from the bank, each of which was
secured by future receivables.414
Soon after the contractor received the second SBA guarantee, the
Government terminated two of the contractor's contracts for de-
fault.4 15 As a result, the contractor defaulted on its loans to the
bank, including both the SBA-guaranteed loans and the prior non-
guaranteed loans. 16 Pursuant to the SBA loan guarantees, the bank
obtained payment from the SBA and, in exchange, assigned its
interest in the guaranteed loans to the SBA.417 Meanwhile, the
contractor brought a series of claims against the Government that the
parties eventually settled. 1a Upon learning of the settlement, the
bank, pursuant to the Assignment of Claims Act, requested that the
Government pay the amount of the settlement to the bank.1 The
Government denied the request and, instead, unsuccessfully sought
to recoup the payment it had made to the contractor.42° When the
Government did not make payment to the bank, the bank filed an
action in the Court of Federal Claims seeking payment of the
settlement amount.42' Holding for the Government, the Court of
Federal Claims concluded that the bank had assigned its rights to the
SBA, and, as a result, the bank had no further claim on any monies
due to the contractor.4'
The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of Federal Claims decision,
because it concluded that, under the loan agreements, the bank's
411. M at 382.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, No. 90-3961C, 1992 WL 677195
(CI. Ct. Oct. 16, 1992).
422. Id. at *2. The court also granted summary judgment for the Government on its claim
against the contractor, holding that the contractor should reimburse the Government for the
amounts paid under the settlement because the amounts had been paid erroneously. Id. at *3.
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right to payment was superior to that of the Government.121 In
reaching this decision, the Federal Circuit concluded that the rights
of the SBA under the guaranteed loans had attached after the bank's
interest under the earlier loans. 24 The court reasoned that both
loans were secured by the same collateral and that the SBA knew of
the bank's senior interest in the contract payments.4 Thus, having
received timely notice of the assignment, the Government paid the
contractor under the settlement agreement at its peril.42  This
payment, the court concluded, was a payment that should have gone
to the bank under the assignment, as prescribed by the Assignment
of Claims Act.
427
Further, the Federal Circuit held that the Government had no right
to set off the amount the contractor owed to the SBA against the
amounts due to the bank.428 The contract between the Government
and the contractor provided that an assignee's right to contract
payments could not be reduced by any liability of the contractor to
the Government that arose "independently" of the contract.429 The
court explained that this clause was intended to promote the goals
behind the Assignment of Claims Act by making it easier for
contractors to obtain financing by assuring lenders that their security
could not be affected by any extra-contractual obligations of the
contractor to the Government.4 ° Although the Government can
assert any defenses arising under the contract against the assignee, it
cannot assert obligations of the contractor arising outside of the
contract.431 In this case, the contractor's liability to the Government
on the SBA loans did not arise from the contracts but rather from the
loan documents and, thus, was independent of the contracts.4 3 2
423. Bank of America, 23 F.3d at 384. The Federal Circuit also reversed the lower court's
conclusion as to the contractor, holding that the Government could not renege on its settlement
with the contractor. If.
424. 1&
425. 1&
426. Id.
427. 1&
428. 1l at 385.
429. 1&
430. 1&
431. AL
432. Id In a concurring opinion,Judge Mayer concluded that the Court of Federal Claims
was withoutjurisdiction to consider the Government's claim against the contractor because the
claim arose out of the settlement agreement between the Government and the contractor and
the settlement agreement was not a procurement covered by the Contract Disputes Act, 41
U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988). Id. at 385-86 (Mayer, J., concurring). Judge Mayer concluded that,
if the Government desires to file a claim to recoup any allegedly erroneously made payments,
it is required to file an independent action in federal district court. AL at 388 (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
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The Federal Circuit's holding in this case is consistent with general
commercial principles and is in accordance with the letter and spirit
of the Assignment of Claims Act.
433
H. Tax Escalation
In Kimbrell v. Fischer,4" the Federal Circuit, for only the second
time in ten years, examined a tax escalation clause contained in a
contract for the lease and improvement of property." In Kimbrell,
the court held that a lessor was not entitled to an equitable adjust-
ment for increased taxes in the year following completion of improve-
ments to the property because the property had not been fully
assessed for tax purposes until after the completion of the improve-
ments.436 Pursuant to the tax escalation clause in the contract, the
Government was required to absorb any increases in real estate taxes
levied after "the calendar year in which its lease commences (base
year) .... If no full tax assessment is made during the calendar year
in which the government lease commences, the base year will be the
first year of a full assessment."
43 7
The contract between the Kimbrells and the Government was
executed onJune 15, 1988, six months after the valuation date for the
1988 tax appraisal.' After the commencement of the lease, the
lessor constructed a building for use by the Government. 439  The
improved property, therefore, was not appraised for tax purposes until
1989.44o The taxes for 1989 reflected not merely the new building,
433. 1& at 385. In a nonprecedential decision concerning the FAR cost principles, the
Federal Circuit affirmed an ASBCA decision whose reasoning is relevant to an issue that arises
in many corporate transactions involving government contractors. In Aspin v. Eaton Corp., 26
F.3d 140, No. 93-1559, 1994 WL 180329, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 1994) (per curiam), a/7'g
ASBCA No. 34,355,93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,743 (1993), the Federal Circuit agreed that the sale
of a contractor's stock, rather than its assets, did not cause the contractor to realize any "gains"
to credit the Government under FAR 31.205-16. The ASBCA reasoned that generally accepted
accounting principles "recognize [] the stockholders and the company whose stock they hold
as two separate accounting, as well as legal, entities." Aspin v. Eaton Corp., ASBCA No. 34,335,
93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,743, at 128,097. That same reasoning should apply to the Anti-
Assignment Acts, to support the view that stock transactions do not affect transfers of
Government contracts and thus are not subject to the novation requirements of FAR subpart
42.12. See Marcia G. Madsen & David R. Johnson, Corporate Transactions Involving Government
Contractors, 57 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 444, 446-47 (1992) (arguing that changes in corporate
stock ownership do not transfer corporation's government contracts and thus do not require
novation).
434. 15 F.3d 175 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
435. Rimbrell v. Fischer, 15 F.3d 175, 175-76 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
436. XL at 178.
437. I& at 176. The contract also provided that in the event of any decrease in taxes, the
rent would be adjusted downward. Id.
438. IdL
439. Id.
440. Id.
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but also included a major increase in real estate tax rates. 44 1 As a
result, the lessor sought an equitable adjustment under the tax
escalation clause.1 2 The Government denied the request and stated
that although the lease had commenced in 1988, there was no full tax
assessment until 1989.4' As a result, 1989 was the "base year" for
tax adjustment purposes. 4  In comparing taxes for the year 1990
with those for 1989, the base year, the Government took the position
that it, rather than the lessor, was entitled to an adjustment because
the amount of taxes paid by the lessor in 1990 had actually decreased
between 1989 and 1990.' On appeal from the Government's
denial of the request for equitable adjustment, the GSBCA held for
the Government and concluded that the base year for tax purposes
was 1989.'6
The Federal Circuit affirmed the GSBCA's decision, strictly
interpreting the tax escalation clause."7  The Federal Circuit rea-
soned that the 1988 assessment, which was conducted prior to
commencement of the lease, was based on the value of the unim-
proved land."' The improvements, therefore, were not included in
the tax assessment until 1989 and, under the tax escalation clause,
there could be no "full assessment" of the property until all of the
improvements were completed." 9 As a result, the court concluded
that "no tax increase between 1988 and 1989 passes through."4
The Federal Circuit's technical interpretation of the tax escalation
clause misconstrues the apparent intent of the clause. The opinion
notes that the clause "transfer[s] to the government the risk of
increases in real estate taxes assessedduring the term of the lease,"
but the court failed to apply the clause in light of this stated pur-
pose."' In analyzing the case, the court focused almost entirely on
increases in taxes resulting from the improvements to the property
and dismissed the distinction drawn by the contractor between tax
increases due to improvements and tax increases due to changes in
441. Id.
442. Md
443. IL
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 178.
448. Id. at 177.
449. Id
450. Id. at 178.
451. Id. at 176.
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the tax rate.4t 2 The clause does not make this distinction, and it is
not clear that the parties had considered the proper allocation of this
risk. The court nevertheless read the clause as if the intended
purpose was to pass on to the Government only those tax rate
increases that occurred after the first year of full assessment."
The Federal Circuit does not discuss why it was reasonable to
interpret the clause as allocating to the Government only tax rate
increases that occurred after the first year of full assessment but not
those that occurred between the commencement of the lease and the
first year of full assessment.' If, as the court has stated, the
purpose of the clause was to transfer to the Government increases in
taxes assessed during the term of the lease but not those resulting
from improvements to the property,455 it is unclear why the Govern-
ment should not be liable for tax rate increases levied prior to the
first year of full assessment.
III. BREACH AND TERMINATION
A. Breach Damages
For the second time in two years, the Federal Circuit addressed the
issue of liquidated damages for a contractor's default where the
Government has not actually incurred any damages. 6  Under
general principles of contract law, a non-breaching party is entitled to
damages sufficient to compensate it for the other party's failure to
fulfill its end of the bargain.' Such damages may be determined
after the fact or may be liquidated by the parties in the agreement
itself.4" Whether the measure of damages is determined before or
after the breach, that measure must be reasonable and should not
452. See id. at 177 (citing Wetzel, GSBCA No. 7466, 85-2 B.CA (CCH) 18,099, at 90,860
(1985), for proposition that "'tax escalation clause is not to be interpreted to hold [the
Government) responsible for tax increases, resulting from improvements'"); see also id. (citing
Universal Dev. Corp. v. GSA, GSBCANos. 12138, 12139,93-3 B.C_. (CCH) 1 26,100, at 129,740
(1993) (holding that "rent adjustments related to tax increases could not be made until after
the tax assessment included the land and the buildings that were being leased by the
government")).
453. Kimbreg 15 F.3d at 177.
454. l
455. I. at 178.
456. See infra note 479 and accompanying text. This is one of the few times that the Federal
Circuit has considered a liquidated damages clause on the merits; see also Fred A. Arnold, Inc.
v. United States, No. 92-5008, 1992 WL 238365, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 1992) (holding that
liquidated damage clauses are enforceable if they constitute fair and reasonable estimate of
government delay damages).
457. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 347.
458. CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 599-624 (1975).
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serve as a penalty or a windfall.459 In the case of liquidated damag-
es, the goal is to eliminate the need to prove damages. In this regard,
liquidated damages clauses are enforced to the extent that "they
represent fair and reasonable estimates of the damages" to be
incurred.4 °
In Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States,461 the Federal Circuit held
that the Government was entitled to damages for a contractor's
default on a timber contract in accordance with the measure of
damages set forth in the contract 462  This damage provision was
upheld notwithstanding the fact that the Government decided not to
resell the timber but rather to preserve the timber lands as a
protected habitat for the spotted owl. 41 The agreement contained
a mechanism for calculating damages due the Government in the
event that the contractor failed to harvest timber and the Government
did not resell the timber.4 4 Under this formula, the damages due
the Government were to "be determined by subtracting the value
established by [an] appraisal from the difference between Current
Contract Value and Effective Purchaser Credit."
465
After the commencement of the contract, the timber market
collapsed.4" In response to the falling prices, the Government
instituted the Multi-Sale Extension Program that permitted timber
contractors to extend their contract termination dates by submitting
appropriate requests by a certain date.467 The contractor in Hoskins,
however, did not submit a request for an extension4" but, instead,
joined with a number of other timber contractors in obtaining an
injunction that prevented the Government from, inter alia, enforcing
the parties' respective timber contracts.46 9 Upon dissolution of the
injunction on appeal, but after the date originally set for filing its
request, the contractor filed its request for a contract extension.470
459. Id. at 613-14.
460. Fred A. Arnold, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-5008, 1992 WL 238365, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Sep. 28, 1992) (citing Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947), and Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 152 (1956)).
461. 20 F.3d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
462. Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
463. Id. at 1147-48.
464. Id at 1147.
465. Id
466. Id. at 1145.
467. Id.
468. Id at 1146.
469. Id.
470. Id.
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The Government rejected the contractor's filing as untimely and
notified the contractor that it was in default.471
Relying on Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States,472 the Claims
Court in Hoskins upheld the Government's termination for default but
dismissed its counterclaim for damages.4 7 In Louisiana-Paific, the
Government had attempted unsuccessfully to renegotiate a contract
to reduce the amount of timber required to be cut in order to
preserve the timber indefinitely.474 Later, upon the contractor's
default, the Claims Court held that the Government could not collect
damages for the timber that it had no intention of reselling.47
Pursuant to Louisiana-Pacific, the Claims Court in Hoskins held that the
Government could not collect both damages under the contract and
the value of the standing timber as a preserve for the spotted owl. 6
The court indicated that allowing such a recovery would be contrary
to generally accepted contract principles.477
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court as to the
contractor's default, but reversed and remanded on the issue of
damages.47 In reversing the lower court decision on damages, the
Federal Circuit cited its recent ruling in Madigan v. Hobin Lumber
Co.,4 9 which the Court characterized as "legally indistinguishable"
from the case at bar."9 In Hobin, the Federal Circuit held that the
Government was entitled to collect damages for the contractor's
breach under the same damages formula set forth in the contract in
Hoskins, notwithstanding the Government's decision not to resell the
timber."' Relying on Hobin, the Federal Circuit in Hoskins remand-
ed the issue of damages and instructed the lower court to apply the
measure of damages provision set forth in the contract.8 2
471. Id.
472. 227 Ct. Cl. 756 (1981).
473. Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 259, 268 (1991), aFl4 20 F.3d 1144
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
474. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 756, 758 (1981).
475. Id.
476. Hoskins, 24 Cl. Ct. at 268.
477. Id.
478. Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1144, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
479. 986 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
480. Hoskins, 20 F.3d at 1148.
481. Madigan v. Hobin Lumber Co., 986 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court in
Hobin limited Louisiana-Paaflc to its facts, concluding that, in order for the holding in Louisiana-
Padfic: to apply the Government must have (1) decided during the period of contract
performance that it does not want all of the contract timber cut; (2) attempted to modify the
contract during the period of contract performance to limit the timber the contractor is
otherwise required to cut, and the contractor refused to modify the contract; and (3)
subsequently sought to recover damages on the precise timber that the Government initially
sought to limit. Id. at 1405.
482. Hoskins, 20 F.3d at 1148.
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Judge Newman dissented from what she characterized as an
"unwarranted and unfair ruling,"0 concluding that the contractor
was not in default and that Louisiana-Pacific required affirmance of the
lower court's judgment.' In her dissent, Judge Newman noted
that Hobin did not overrule Louisiana-Pacific, which would have
required an en banc ruling of the Federal Circuit, and that, as a
result, the Hoskins court was bound by Louisiana-Pacific." Judge
Newman also stated that the Claims Court had correctly concluded,
in accordance with Louisiana-Pacific, that the Government's decision
that the best use of the affected timber lands was as a preservation for
the spotted owl overrode the measure of damages provision contained
in the contract.486 In Judge Newman's view, the Government should
not be entitled to damages "based on a valuation that is contrary to
fact, and in the absence of injury to the government."487 Indeed,
Judge Newman noted:
It is irrational to require that although the nation now benefits
from non-harvesting of the timber, Hoskins must pay damages as if
the timber had been harvested during the period when harvesting
was enjoined. On the panel majority's ruling the government
obtains double recovery: both the dollar value of the timber as if
it had been illegally cut, and the habitat value of the uncut
timber.4"s
In the Hoskins case, the Federal Circuit had the opportunity to
reexamine its conclusion in Hobin and to affirm the more equitable
decisions of the Claims Court in both this case and Louisiana-Pacific.
Instead, the court did precisely the opposite. As the dissent noted,
both Hobin and Hoskins permit the Government to obtain a double
recovery-a concept that is contrary to basic contract damages
principles. 9
483. Id at 1153 (Newman,J., dissenting).
484. Id. at 1152 (Newman,J., dissenting).
485. Id. (NewmanJ., dissenting).
486. Id, at 1151-52 (NewmanJ., dissenting).
487. Id. at 1153 (NewmanJ., dissenting) (citing Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 227
Ct. Cl. 756 (1981)).
488. Id (Newman.J., dissenting).
489. Id. at 1152-53 (Newman, J., dissenting); see aso 3 DAN B. DoBBs, DOBBS LAW OF
REMEDIES 23 (1993) (stating that goal behind money damages is to place nonbreaching party
n "as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, and no better")
:emphasis in original) (citations omitted); supra notes 457-60, 477 and accompanying text
discussing contract damage principles).
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B. Termination for Default
The Government may justify the termination of a contract for
default if there existed adequate cause at the time, even if this cause
was not discovered until after the termination.4" There have been
two decisions by the Federal Circitit during the current term where
the Government, on appeal, has sought to justify a termination for
default after the fact by pointing to violations of federal labor
standards.49 In both cases, the court made clear that it would hold
the contractors strictly to the terms of these standards and would
allow the Government to raise the issue later upon appeal.49
In the only reported decision, Kelso v. Kirk Bros. Mechanical
Contractors, Inc.,"' the Federal Circuit held that a contractor's failure
to retain certain records in accordance with federal labor standards
justified the Government's decision to terminate the contractor for
default. 4 The court reached this determination notwithstanding
the ASBCA's conclusion that the contractor's retention practices
satisfied the "basic records" requirement of the federal labor
reporting standards and the fact that the reporting standards did not
relate to contract performance.9 5 The Government had terminated
the contract for default after discovering certain performance
deficiencies.49 The contract had no completion date, and the
Government provided the contractor with no period within which to
cure its default.497 On appeal before the ASBCA, the Government
alleged for the first time, as an alternative basis for the termination,
that the contractor's failure to comply with federal labor reporting
standards justified the Government's earlier termination decision.498
The ASBCA held for the contractor and converted the default
termination into a termination for the Government's convenience
490. See Quality Granite Constr. Co. v. Aspin, No. 93-1547, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7755, at
*•1-*2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 1994) (stating that "a default termination can be justified on appeal
on any ground that existed at the time of termination, whether or not the contracting officer
(CO) knew of the ground at the time."); see alsoJoseph Morton Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d
1273, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that if fraud by contractor would support Government's
termination of contract for default if discovered before termination, then such fraud can be
used to terminate contract if discovered after termination).
491. See generally Quality Granite, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7755; Kelso v. Kirk Bros. Mechanical
Contractors, Inc., 16 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
492. Quality Granite, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7755, at *1; Kirk Brothers, 16 F.3d at 1176.
493. 16 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
494. Kelso v. Kirk Bros. Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 16 F.3d 1173, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
495. X. at 1175-76.
496. See id. (stating that reason for contract termination was failure to maintain basic
records).
497. li.
498. IL
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because the Government had failed to provide the contractor with an
opportunity to cure its deficiencies.4" In addition, the ASBCA held
that the contractor's violation of the federal labor reporting standards
was not a basis for default because the contractor had satisfied the
basic requirements of these standards. 00
The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the Government had
properly terminated the contract for default. 0 In upholding the
default termination, the court emphasized the importance of the
federal labor standards contract clauses and rejected the ASBCA's
conclusion that the contractor's failure to comply with the federal
labor standards was a mere technicality."2  Instead, the court
concluded that the contractor was bound by the strict terms of the
contract clauses and that its violations were substantial."0 3 The
contractor's failure to abide by the terms of these clauses justified the
default termination, notwithstanding the fact that the Government
raised this issue for the first time on appeal to the ASBCA and the
fact that the labor standards did not relate to contract perfor-
mance."' The Federal Circuit's decision in Kirk Brothers, therefore,
reaffirms both the Government's right to justify a default termination
after the fact and its right to hold contractors to the strict terms of
their contracts.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Claim Certification
For claims against the Government of more than $100,000, the
CDA505 requires contractors to certify, inter alia, that the claim is
499. Kirk Bros. Mechanical Contractors, ASBCA Nos. 35771R, 39803, 40172, 40872, 92-3
B.CA (CCH) 1 25,144, at 125,344 (1992).
500. Kirk Brothers, 92-3 B.CA (CCH), at 125,344. The ASBCA also concluded that although
the Government was partially to blame for the contractor's delay in performance, the contractor
suffered no damages because of its own concurrent delay. Id.
501. Kirk Brothers, 16 F.3d at 1176-77. In addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's
conclusion that the contractor had suffered no damages as a result of the Government's delay.
Id. at 1177. In this regard, the court concluded that, in circumstances where both parties share
responsibility for the delay, damages should not be awarded unless they could be apportioned
between the parties. Id. (citingWilliam F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 805,808-
09 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In Kirk Brothers, the court held that the ASBCA correctly determined that
there was no period during which the Government was the sole cause of the contractor's delay.
IM.
502. Id.
503. IdM
504. See id.
505. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also supra note 96 and accompanying
text (discussing procedures allowing contractors to bring claims directly to federal court, rather
than originating claim within agency jurisdiction).
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made in "good faith."5" Although the jurisdictional impact of the
certification requirement was diminished by the Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992,507 presentation of a certified claim by
a contractor still remains an absolute prerequisite to the CDAjurisdic-
tion of the courts and boards."° The certification requirement has
proved generally problematic for government contractors? °9 The
requirement is particularly troublesome in the claim-sponsorship
context where the prime contractor does not entirely endorse the
subcontractor's claim.10
For a subcontractor to proceed with a claim against the Govern-
ment under the CDA, it must obtain the prime contractor's consent
and the appeal must be brought in the prime contractor's name. 11
Congress, in enacting this "sponsorship" system, intended for prime
contractors to review subcontractor claims in order to prevent the
filing of false or fraudulent claims. 1 2 When sponsoring a sub-
contractor's claim, prime contractors must independently certify the
claim in accordance with the CDA. 13 Problems arise where the
prime contractor is unwilling or unable to verify the basis and amount
of the subcontractor's claim.5" 4 In this situation, the prime contrac-
tor may be faced with two undesirable choices: the contractor can
506. Id. § 605(c) (1). The CDA requires that a contractor certify that "the claim is made in
good faith, that the supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and
belief, and that the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the
contractor believes the government is liable," and that the certifying official is duly authorized
to certify the claim. Id. The dollar threshold for claim certifications was increased from $50,000
to $100,000 by the FASA, Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 2351(b), 108 Star. 3243, 3322 (1994) (codified
in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
507. Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907, 106 Stat. 4506,4518 (1992). added subparagraph (6) to 41
U.S.C. § 605(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This subparagraph states that a "defect in the
certification of a claim shall not deprive a court or an agency board of contract appeals of
jurisdiction over that claim."
508. See Eurostyle, Inc., ASBCA No. 45934,94-1 B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,458, at 131,65455 (1994)
(denying monetary relief where contractor failed to specifically mention such in written claim).
509. See REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO OFPP [OFFICE OF FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT POLICY] POLICY LETTER 80-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 8495 (1992) (recognizing extensive
drain on government, contractor, andjudicial resources caused by claim certification litigation).
See generally Robert H. Koehler, Certifying Claims Under the Contract Disputes Act-The Ghost of
Rickover Past, 21 PUn. CoNT. LJ. 25,37-47 (1991) (discussing claim certification, amount of claim
allowed, notification requirements, presumptions, and times of issuance under CDA).
510. See supra note 509 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in claim sponsorship).
511. SeeErickson Air Crane Co. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating
that subcontractors do not have direct standing to sue Government);Johnson Controls v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1541, 1550-52 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that subcontractors have no right of
direct appeal under CDA).
512. SeeS. REP. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5235, 5250-51.
513. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also United States v. Turner Constr. Co.,
827 F.2d 1554, 1558-60 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (enforcing certification requirement upon prime
contractors when certifying subcontractor's claims).
514. See id. at 1561.
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either refuse to certify the claim and expose itself to suit from the
subcontractor, or it can certify the claim and expose itself to potential
criminal and civil liability to the Government.-5
The Federal Circuit has addressed the prime contractor's responsi-
bility to independently certify subcontractor claims on two previous
occasions in Turner Construction Co. v. United States,516 and in
Transamerica Insurance Corp. v. United States.17 In Turner, the Federal
Circuit held that the prime contractor's responsibility to independent-
ly certify the claim required the prime contractor merely to assert that
there was "good ground" for the claim, not that the basis of the claim
was certain.1 In Transamerica, the Federal Circuit held that the
prime contractor was in "substantial compliance" with the certification
requirements of the CDA when it submitted a properly worded
certification accompanied by a caveat that it could not verify the
certified amount because it was prevented from reviewing the
subcontractor's records." 9 Reinforcing Turner, the Federal Circuit
accepted the certification despite the caveat because the prime
contractor also stated that it had no reason to believe that the
subcontractor's "cost figures and delay estimates" were erroneous.52
In the court's view, this statement demonstrated that the prime
contractor possessed the necessary "good ground" for certifying the
claim.521
In Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton,122 the Federal Circuit held
that even where the prime contractor openly admits that it does not
have a "good ground" belief in the subcontractor's claim, but executes
a claim certification under the direction of a federal court order, it
has satisfied the CDA requirement that a claim be certified in "good
faith."5 2  The claim in Diamond arose out of extra work performed
by Diamond's subcontractor on a pier improvement project at a New
515. SeeJohn Cibinic, Subcontractor Claims: Contractor Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place,
3 NASH & CIBiNIC REP. 74, at 157-58 (1989) (describingprime contractors' dilemma in liability
issues); John Thrasher, Subcontractor Dispute Remedies: Asserting Subcontractor Claims Against the
Federal Government, 23 PUB. CONT. L.J. 39, 85-93 (1993) (discussing consent provisions in CDA
certification procedures).
516. 827 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
517. 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
518. United States v. Turner Constr. Co., 827 F.2d 1554, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[The
prime contractor should not, through the requirement that it certify subcontractor claims, be
used as a substitute for the contracting officer or the board in determination of the merits of
the submitted claims under the CDA.").
519. Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
520. Id at 1580.
521. Id. at 1581.
522. 25 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
523. Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton, 25 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Jersey Naval Weapons Station.524  During contract performance,
barges owned by an unrelated government dredging contractor
collided with the pier.5" As a result of the accident, the Navy
directed Diamond to perform extra work under the contract.526
Subsequently, Diamond submitted an uncertified claim from its
subcontractor, Perth Amboy 'Ironworks (PA), for $1.9 million in
additional compensation.527 After the Navy returned the claim to
Diamond for lack of certification, Diamond reviewed it and concluded
that PA was only entitled to $44,000.528 Consequently, Diamond
declined to certify the $1.9 million claim and told PAI that to do so
might constitute perjury. - 9  PA subsequently declared chapter 11
bankruptcy." During the bankruptcy proceedings, the judge
ordered Diamond to certify the claim in accordance with the
CDA.53' The judge based his order on the erroneous advice of a
"special counsel" who advised the court that Diamond could rely on
PA's certification to pass through the claim to the Government.5 32
Diamond complied with the court order, certified the claim and
informed the Navy that it had certified the claim in response to the
bankruptcy court's order. 3  The contracting officer denied the
claim, and Diamond appealed to the ASBCA.51
In the appeal, the Navy attacked Diamond's certification of the
claim and moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the ground that Diamond could not certify the claim
in "good faith."" Despite the fact that Diamond had submitted a
properly worded certification, the ASBCA, after examining the
circumstances underlying the certification, dismissed Diamond's claim
without prejudice.5" In the Board's view, Diamond could not
524. Id. at 1007.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 1008.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1010-11. The decisions relied on by the special counsel predated the enactment
of the CDA. Arnold M. Diamond, Inc., ASBCA No. 40885, 93-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 25,680, at
127,743 (1992).
533. Diamond, 25 F.3d at 1009.
534. Diamond, 93-2 B.CA. (CCH), at 127,743 (dismissing appeal without prejudice),
reconsideration denied, 93-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,083 (1992).
535. Id.
536. Id. The ASBCA considered Diamond's public rejection of PAl's claim to be unusual
enough to justify a departure from its normal unwillingness to examine the accuracy of the
statements contained in claim certifications. Diamond, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH), at 127,742. The
board usually declines to undertake such inquiries because they "would necessarily require an
examination of the underlying basis and merits of the claim." Id. (quoting Turner Construction,
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certify the claim in "good faith" because its statements to the
subcontractor and the Bankruptcy Court that it could only verify
$44,000 of the subcontractor's $1.9 million claim53 7 "demonstrated
that it did not consider that there was good ground to support its
subcontractor's claim."5" The Board also noted that the bankruptcy
court's order could not overcomeDiamond's responsibility to certify
the claim in good faith, because, in the Board's view, the order
violated the CDA.5 9 Diamond appealed to the Federal Circuit.54
In reversing the Board's decision, the Federal Circuit found that
Diamond had fully complied with the congressional mandate that
prime contractors review subcontractor claims prior to submis-
sion.5 4  The court stated that it thought that "the Board erred in
declining to give any weight to Diamond's compliance with the
bankruptcy court's order in deciding the issue of Diamond's good
faith." 42  In the court's view, compliance with the bankruptcy
court's order provided the necessary "good ground" to certify the
claim as required under Turner Construction. "  Finding no defini-
tion of "good faith" in the CDA, the court applied the common usage
definition of "a state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom
from intent to defraud, and being faithful to one's duty or obliga-
tion."544 The court concluded that Diamond had no intention
either to defraud or deceive the Government because it had made a
"conscientious effort to meet its ethical, contractual and statutory
obligations." 45
827 F.2d at 1561); see alsoBlount Constr. Group, ASBCA No. 38998,92-3 B.C. (CCH) 25,163,
at 125,418 (1992) (denying Government's motion to dismiss); AAAA Enters., Inc., ASBCA No.
29041,84-2 B.CA (CCH) 17,262, at 85,959 (1984) (denying Government's motion to dismiss);
Mary Lou Fashions, ASBCA No. 29318, 84-2 B.CA (CCH) 17,483, at 87,100 (1984) (refusing
to rule on substance of claims).
The Board recently stated that its decision to examine the underlying facts and circumstances
of the certifications in Diamond did not alter its general practice of refusing to conduct such
examinations in other than extraordinary circumstances. D.E.W., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 37232,
45512, 94-3 B.Ca.4 (CCH) 1 27,004 at 134,535 (1994).
537. Diamond, 93-2 B.CA (CCH), at 127,742-43.
538. Id. at 127,743. The Board further stated that "[hionesty with a subcontractor or the
baring of one's soul to the Bankruptcy Court is not the good faith envisioned by the CDA
certification requirement. The claim must be submitted to the Government in good faith.
There is ample evidence that was not done in this case." Id.
539. Id.
540. Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. United States, 25 F.3d 1006, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
541. Id.
542. Id. at 1010.
543. Id. at 1009 n.2 (citing United States v. Turner Constr. Co., 827 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
544. Id. at 1010.
545. Id. (quoting Diamond, 93-2 B.CA (CCH), at 127,743).
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Unlike the ASBCA, the Federal Circuit viewed Diamond's actions
as "a good faith effort to comply with the obligations with which it was
confronted.5 4 6  Under the circumstances, compliance with the
court order was the only viable alternative for a reasonable contractor
to demonstrate good faith, and thus Diamond fully satisfied the CDA
requirement that claims be certified in "good faith."54 The Federal
Circuit also disagreed with the ASBCA regarding the bankruptcy
court's powers, pointing out that the bankruptcy court had subject
matter jurisdiction over PAl's claim, had obtained jurisdiction over
Diamond, and had the authority to issue a civil contempt order if
Diamond did not comply with the bankruptcy court's order to certify
and sponsor PA's claim.5" The Federal Circuit further noted that
a failure to certify would have exposed Diamond to a damage suit
from PA or a citation for civil contempt.
5 49
The impact of Diamond on the evolution of the copious certification
jurisprudence of the CDA tribunals will be minimal because the
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992550 rendered certification
defects nonjurisdictional. 5 ' The Diamond decision may, however,
have some significance beyond that of a mere historical footnote in
the jurisdictional quagmire of claims certification. The decision in
Diamond reflects the willingness of some members of the Federal
Circuit to move toward a "common sense" approach in resolving
jurisdictional issues with regard to CDA claims. This "common sense"
approach was most apparent in Transamerica Insurance Corp.552 in
which the Federal Circuit held that a contractor fulfilling claim and
certification requirements "substantially complied" with the CDA 5"
In Diamond, the Federal Circuit found jurisdiction because the
prime contractor acted reasonably under the circumstances, 554
whereas the ASBCA had dismissed the claim even after finding that
546. Diamond, 25 F.3d at 1011.
547. Id. at 1010.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 1011.
550. Pub. L No. 102-572, § 907, 106 Stat. 4518 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 605
(Supp. V 1993)).
551. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-572, § 907, 106 Star.
4518 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. 605(c) (Supp. V. 1993)) (stating that certification
defects do not deprive courts or agency boards of contract appeals ofjurisdiction).
552. 973 F.2d 1572 (1992); seesupranotes 519-22 and accompanying text (describing in detail
court's treatment of "common sense" approach in Transameica).
553. Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra
notes 519-22 and accompanying text (discussing court's holding that prime contractor's
certification that contained critical information required substantial compliance with certification
requirement).
554. Diamond, 25 F.3d at 1010.
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the prime contractor made "a conscientious effort" to comply with the
CDA. 55 Too often the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA have
penalized contractors who make good faith efforts to comply. The
"common sense" approach employed by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Diamond should encourage the Court of Federal
Claims and the boards of contract appeals to employ similar analyses,
rather than the impractical and rigid approach these institutions have
exhibited toward the certification requirement in the past (and
continue to embrace in analyzing the "in dispute" and "sum certain"
requirements of Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States).5'
B. Statutes of Limitations
The CDA contains two separate limitations periods for contractor
appeals from adverse decisions of contracting officers. The CDA
prescribes a ninety-day limitation period for appeals from contracting
officer's decisions to the boards of contract appeals,557 and a one-
year limitation period for appeals to the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.5" Shipbuilding contractors were faced with an additional
limitation period of eighteen months for the filing of shipbuilding
claims with the Government under the Defense Authorization Act of
1985.111 In contrast, other kinds of CDA claims were subject to no
statutory limitation period for presentation to the contracting offi-
cer. ° These jurisdictional anomalies were addressed, in part, by
555. Diamond, ASBCA No. 40885, 93-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 25,680 at 127,743 (1992).
556. 930 F.2d 872, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that no jurisdiction exists where there is
no "dispute" over "sum certain" prior to submission of claim to contracting officer); see also
Reflectone, Inc., ASBCA No. 43081, 93-1 B.CA (CCH) 25,512, reconsideration denied, 93-3
B.CA 1 25,966, at 129,135 (1993) (dismissing claim without pre-existing dispute regarding sum
certain before the contractorfiled its claim), afftd, 34 F.3d 1031, 1031-39 (Fed. Cir.), reh'en bane
accepted, judg vacated, and op. withdrawn, 34 F.3d 1039, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Val S. McWhorter
& Carl T. Hahn, Disputing the Meaning of a Claim: The Fallout from Dawco Construction, 23 Pun.
CoNT. LJ. 451, 459-60 (1994) (discussing implications of Dawco's rigid requirements).
557. 41 U.S.C. § 606 (1988).
558. Id. § 609(a)(3). This anomaly may not survive this year, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy and the Department of Defense recently proposed that the period for
appeals to the Court of Federal Claims be shortened to ninety days. OFPP-DOD Draft Bill Aims
to Curb Litigation, Gut Brooks Act, 63 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 117 (Jan. 30, 1995).
559. 10 U.S.C. § 2405 (1994). Section 2405(c) provides:
The Secretary of a military department may not adjust any price under a shipbuilding
contract entered into after December 7, 1983, for an amount set forth in a claim,
request for equitable adjustment, or demand for payment under the contract ...
arising out of events occurring more than 18 months before the submission of the
claim, request, or demand.
hL § 2405(a). The statute also provides that "a claim, request, or demand shall be considered
to have been submitted only when the contractor has provided the certification required by...
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978." Id. § 2405(b).
560. See Board of Governors v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 27, 30 (1986) (finding that
limitations period under CDA runs from issuance of contracting officer's decision, or failure to
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the recently enacted Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994,561 which institutes a six-year limitation period for the presenta-
tion of claims for all contracts,562 including shipbuilding contracts
entered into after October 18, 1994.51
Even though it was enacted in 1984, the special limitation on
shipbuilding contracts was not interpreted by the courts or boards
until 1992 in Peterson Builders, Inc. v. United States.56  The Claims
Court in Peterson treated the eighteen-month limitation as a statute of
limitations depriving the court of jurisdiction." On the other
hand, the ASBCA held that where such claims are untimely, § 2405
is an affirmative defense available to the Government rather than a
jurisdictional statute of limitations.5'
When the Federal Circuit addressed the issue in Bath Iron Works v.
United States,567 it held that the eighteen-month limitation in § 2405
does not create either ajurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to
the prosecution of shipbuilding claims under the CDA in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims.5 Bath entered into a series of contracts
with the Navy to construct Ticonderoga class cruisers in 1983 and
1984.569 During performance, the Navy issued several Engineering
Change Proposals (ECPs) under the contracts.57 Bath subsequently
filed claims for price adjustments under two of the contracts.57 1 In
June 1985, Bath first notified the Navy that it was incurring extra costs
and would seek an equitable adjustment to the contract due to the
ECPs.172  After a period of dialogue," Bath submitted a certified
claim to the contracting officer in November 1989.Y The claims
issue decision in timely manner, and CDA claim submitted after general six-year statute of
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2501 or 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) is not untimely if contractor first elected
to certify claim with contracting officer).
561. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, Pub. L No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (1994)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 251 (1988)).
562. ld § 2351 (a), 108 Star. at 3322.
563. 1& § 2302(a), 108 Stat. at 3321.
564. 26 Cl. Ct. 1227 (1992).
565. Peterson Builders, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1227, 1230-32 (1992).
566. See Bath Iron Works, ASBCA No. 43,303, 93-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,792, at 128,347-48
(1993), remnsideratan denied, 93-3 B.CA 25,992, at 129,233 (1993) (stating that § 2405 does
not operate as statute of limitations, but rather statutory affirmative defense whose terms address
only agency's authority to enter claim).
567. 20 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
568. Bath Iron Works v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1585 (1994).
569. Bath Iron Works v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 114, 116 (1992).
570. Id
571. It at 117.
572. I&
573. IMt at 119.
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were denied by the Navy on the ground that, inter alia, the claims
were time-barred by § 2405.174
Bath appealed to the Claims Court arguing that its claim was valid
under the "Changes" clause of the contract and the CDA.575 The
Government filed a motion to dismiss, arguing first that a failure to
submit a claim within the eighteen-month limitation period of 10
U.S.C. § 2405 violated the CDA's jurisdictional requirement that a
"properly certified" claim be submitted to the contracting officer;576
second, that § 2405 created an eighteen-month statute of limitation
for all shipbuilding contract claims;"' and third, that even if § 2405
did not create a jurisdictional limitation, it created an affirmative
defense to the contractor's claim.578
The Court of Federal Claims focused on whether the eighteen-
month limitation requirement of § 2405 was a jurisdictional time
bar.79 Examining the plain language of the statute, the court
concluded that the statute was not jurisdictional in nature because it
contained "no reference to the court'sjurisdiction, let alone a specific
limitation on that jurisdiction.""s The court determined that the
statute "directs an impediment only at the Secretary of a military
department's time limitation with respect to which he may make
adjustments to certain shipbuilding contracts, and not to suits against
the United States in the [Court of Federal Claims]."' The court
concluded that § 2405 is "clearly a statute of limitations at the
administrative level against [the contracting officer and] not an
impediment to de novo jurisdiction in [the] court." 5 2 The Court
of Federal Claims, by examining the legislative history of § 2405, also
concluded that it limited only "Secretaries [of the military depart-
ment] from again improvidently settling stale claims" and that the
provision posed no jurisdictional bar to the court or a statute of
limitations on the contractor.5"
574. IdM
575. Id. at 120.
576. Id; see also 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating certification
requirements for claims over $100,000).
577. Bath Iron Works, 27 Fed. Cl. at 120.
578. Id
579. Id. at 121-29.
580. Bath Iron Works v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1572 (1994).
581. Bath Iron Works, 27 Fed. Cl. at 124.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 128 (emphasis in original). The legislative history of§ 2405, and particularly the
testimony of Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, reveals that Congress was specifically concerned
about limiting the Government in repeating its settlement of many stale shipbuilding claims in
1978 for over $2.7 billion. Bath Iron Works, 27 Fed. Cl. at 126-28 (citing Hearings Before the
Subromm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1982) (statement of Admiral
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal
Claims decision, holding that § 2405 applied only to the payment of
adjustments at the administrative level."s The court explored, in
detail, the legislative history of § 2405, its enactment into law, and its
regulatory implementation. " The Federal Circuit noted that the
Government abandoned its argument that § 2405 directly limited the
Court of Federal Claims, and now asserted that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because Bath could not
satisfy anotherjurisdictional prerequisite: a contracting officer's final
decision." 6  The Federal Circuit dismissed the Government's
argument as "fundamentally flawed"5" 7 because it equated the
contracting officer's "authority to render a final decision with the
authority to grant relief." "t Although the contracting officer was
statutorily prohibited from granting relief on untimely claims, the
contracting officer's determination to deny the claim qualified as a
CDA final decision. 89
The Federal Circuit also held that § 2405 did not create an
affirmative defense because it "creates no time-based prohibition to
consideration of the merits of a complaint"5' by the Court of
Federal Claims; only amendments to § 609 of the CDA could impose
such restrictions.59' The court also disagreed with the ASBCA's
holding in Bath Iron Work. 92 that § 2405 creates an affirmative
defense.59 Instead, the Federal Circuit concluded that § 2405 fails
to create an affirmative defense because it "is applicable to neither
contractual rights nor to the courts," not because it is statutory, rather
than contractual, in nature."9
H.G. Rickover).
584. Bath Iron Works, 20 F.3d at 1599.
585. 1l at 1574-78 (discussing Congress' intent to prevent development of massive stale
shipbuilding claims against Navy, which occurred in 1978, by selecting time period of eighteen
months to maximize resolution of claims by negotiated settlement).
586. Id. at 1578; see also 41 U.S.C. § 609(a) (3) (1988) (stating that any appeal to U.S. Court
of Federal Claims "shall be filed within twelve months from the date of receipt by the contractor
of the decision of the contracting officer concerning the claim").
587. Bath Iron Works, 20 F.3d at 1579.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 1580.
591. S& supra note 563 and accompanying text (stating that FASA modifies CDA, 41 U.S.C.
§ 609, creating six-year statute of limitations for presentation of all contracting claims).
592. Bath Iron Works, ASBCANo. 43303,93-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 25,792, at 128,342 (1993). This
case concerned a claim on a contract to construct the Guided Missile Destroyer ARLEIGH
BURKE (DDG-51). Id. at 128,343.
593. Id. at 128,348.
594. Bath Iron Works, 20 F.3d at 1584.
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Although important for shipbuilding contractors, Bath Iron Works
has little significance for the rest of the government contracting
community. Bath Iron Works' limited significance is further reduced
by the elimination of the eighteen-month limitation period enacted
by the FASA 95 Bath Iron Works does not advance the Federal
Circuit'sjurisprudence regarding statutory interpretation or its rulings
regarding limitations periods generally. The most important part of
the ruling may be the general affirmation by the Court that the
central purpose of the CDA is to provide a mechanism for the review
of federal contractor claims, and thus, it is the sole source of any
jurisdictional limitations on the review of such claims.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Boards-The Election Doctrine
The CDA provides contractors with two avenues of appeal from an
adverse final decision of the contracting officer. The contractor may
either appeal to a board of contract appeals within ninety days596 or
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims within one year." The choice of
forum is a decision that belongs entirely to the contractor. Once a
proper "election" is made, however, the decision becomes irrevoca-
ble.59 Thus, if a contractor elects to appeal the decision to a board
of contract appeals on the merits, the contractor may not later
withdraw the board action, and bring suit on the same claim in the
Court of Federal Claims."
595. See supra note 561 and accompanying text; see also H.RL CONF. REP. No. 712,103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1,202 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 2607,2632 (noting that Congress amended
10 U.S.C. § 2405 to conform time permitted for filing of shipbuilding contract claims to same
six-year time period allowed for other government contract claims). Note, however, that the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the Department of Defense have proposed draft
legislation which would directly overturn the Federal Circuits' holding in Bath Iron Works that
the limitation period in 10 U.S.C. § 2405 is non-jurisdictional. See OFPP-DOD Draft Bill Aims to
Curb Litigation, Gut Brooks Ac4 63 FED. CoNTR. REP. (BNA) 117 (Jan. 30, 1995). Section 108
would add to 10 U.S.C. § 2404(a): "No Court or Board shall have jurisdiction of any claim that
was not submitted to the contracting officer for a decision within the period provided by this
section." Id. at 139.
596. 41 U.S.C. § 606 (1988).
597. Id. § 609(a)(3).
598. See National Neighbors, Inc. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that for election to be binding, originally chosen forum must have properjurisdiction).
In addition, to be binding the election must be "informed," "knowing," and "voluntary." Prime
Constr. Co. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 782, 783 (1982). These requirements are often satisfied
by proper disclosure of the contractor's appeal rights in the contracting officer's final decision.
See Mark Smith Constr. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl. 540, 545 (1986) (holding that
contractor's appeal rights, clearly state in contracting officer's decision, satisfies informed
election requirement).
599. See id. (stating that once contractor makes binding election in one forum, contractor
can no longer pursue claim in alternate forum); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 677 F.2d
876 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (holding that contractor, by electing to appeal to board, has foreclosed direct
access to U.S. Court of Claims); see also Stewart-Thomas Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 88773, 90-1
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In Bonneville Associates v. United States,' the Federal Circuit held
that the GSBCA had jurisdiction over a dispute under a GSA dual-
purpose contract for the sale and repair of an office building, and
thus, the contractor's appeal to the GSBCA was a binding choice of
forum that deprived the Court of Federal Claims ofjurisdiction over
a subsequent appeal."1 In Bonneville, the Federal Circuit examined
the nature of the dispute under the dual-purpose contract to
determine whether the GSBCA had jurisdiction over the contractor's
initial appeal. 2  Determining that the dispute concerned the
contract's maintenance provisions, rather than contract's sales
provisions, the court concluded that the GSBCA did have proper
jurisdiction, and thus, Bonneville's election of that forum was
binding. 603
The GSA entered into a contract with Bonneville for the purchase
and subsequent repair and alteration of an office building in Las
Vegas.' Disputes arose, after title conveyance, concerning the
building's structural integrity and its heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning system (HVAC system)." Subsequently, the GSA
contracting officer issued a final decision demanding from Bonneville
the cost of correcting the structural defects and improving the HVAC
system. 6  The contracting officer fixed damages for the structural
defects based on the contract's warranty clause while deficient HVAC
system damages were assessed according to provisions of the contract
relating to repair and alteration work. 7 Bonneville subsequently
filed a timely notice of appeal with the GSBCA, which it withdrew
three months later.' The Board dismissed Bonneville's appeal
without prejudice.'
Prior to dismissal by the GSBCA, Bonneville filed suit on the same
claim in the Court of Federal Claims."'0 There, the Government
B.C.A. (CCH) 1 22,481, at 112,835 (1989) (stating that once contractor chooses to appeal to
board of contract appeals, contractor waives right to bring action into claims court); Bromley
Contracting Co. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 668, 671 (1986) (stating that alternative forum is no
longer available to contractor, once contractor makes binding election to Board of Contract
Appeals).
600. 43 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
601. Bonneville Assocs. v. United States, 43 F.3d 649, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
602. ItL at 651-52.
603. l& at 653-54.
604. Id at 651.
605. See id.
606. IM
607, lM.
608. d.
609. I.
610. Bonneville Assocs. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 85 (1993).
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moved to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction under the Election Doctrine,
arguing that Bonneville's prior appeal to the GSBCA was a binding
choice of forum that deprived the court of jurisdiction."
Bonneville countered that the GSBCA lacked jurisdiction over its
appeal because real property procurements are excluded from the
Board's jurisdiction under § 602(a) (1) of CDA, 12 and thus the
Election Doctrine did not apply.6 13 The Court of Federal Claims
found the contract between Bonneville and the Government was a
dual-purpose contract involving both repair and sale at the building,
although the dispute centered on only the repair component.61 4
The court concluded that contracts for the "repair" and "alteration"
of real property are subject to the CDA, pursuant to § 602(a) (3),6"'
and thus, because the GSBCA was vested with jurisdiction over
Bonneville's appeal, the Election Doctrine required dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.1 6
Bonneville appealed to the Federal Circuit, asserting that the
Election Doctrine was inapplicable because the GSBCA lacked
jurisdiction over its appeal." 7 Bonneville again argued that the
GSBCA was deprived of CDAjurisdiction because the primary purpose
of the contract "was to convey real property to the government" and
the nature of the dispute "concerned the government's procurement
of the building, not the building's repair and, alteration."18
Bonneville asserted that the "conveyance" nature of the dispute was
611. Bonneville Assocs. v. United States, 43 F.d 649, 651 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Election
Doctrine provides that a contractor is precluded from pursuing an appeal to an adverse decision
in more than one forum once a decision is made, despite the fact that the CDA provides for
such a choice. &ee Santa Fe Eng'rs v. United States, 677 F.2d 876, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
612. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988). Section 602 provides:
Applicability of law.
(a) Executive agency contracts. Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, this
chapter applies to any express or implied contract... entered into any an executive
agency for-
(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being,
(2) the procurement of services;
(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real
property, or,
(4) the disposal of personal property.
Id.
613. Bonnewile Assors., 30 Fed. Cl. at 90.
614. IM. at 87-88.
615. See supra note 612 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (1988)).
616. Bonneuille Assocs., 30 Fed. Cl. at 89-90.
617. Bonnemi Assocs., 43 F.3d at 652.
618. I.
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demonstrated by the contracting officer's partial reliance on the
contract's warranty clause in assessing liability.619
The Federal Circuit examined the nature of the dispute between
the parties and concluded that it involved the repair and alteration,
rather than the procurement of the real property, and consequently
the GSBCA had jurisdiction under § 602(a) (3) of the CDA.620 The
court rejected Bonneville's warranty clause argument, reasoning that
"the warranty provision required Bonneville to repair any structural
defects discovered by the government for a period of five years after
the date of closing on the purchase of the building," and thus, the
essence of the dispute "concerned the extent of Bonneville's duty to
repair and alter the building."621 In the court's view the "repair and
alteration" nature of the dispute conferred jurisdiction on the Board
pursuant to § 602(a) (3) of the CDA, and rendered Bonneville's
appeal to the Board a binding election.622
Bonneville Associates reaffirms the vitality of the Election Doctrine
and demonstrates that "the contractor's choice of forum is an
important strategic decision" with significant consequences.6 3 The
ruling demonstrates that the Court of Federal Claims and the boards
of contract appeals will look beyond the purpose of the contract and
examine the nature of the dispute in order to apply the doctrine. If
the essence of the dispute is within the scope of § 602 (a) (3), CDA
jurisdiction will be conferred, and a contractor's election of either
forum will be binding.
D. Counterclaims Under the False Claims Act
Since its decision in Maitin J. Simko Construction, Inc. v. United
States,24 the Federal Circuit has recognized the jurisdictional
propriety of civil counterclaims under the False Claims Act (FCA)62
in CDA suits in the Court of Federal Claims.626 To prove a violation
619. Id. Bonneville argued that the warranty clause was "inextricably linked to the sale of
the building," and thus the contracting officer's reliance on the clause rendered the essential
nature of the dispute outside the scope of the CDA. I
620. 1d. at 654.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 654-55. The court further noted that the dispute "did not involve such matters
as title to the property, the consideration received for it, or other aspects of the conveyance,
which would more clearly be disputes over the procurement of real property." Id. at 654.
623. Id. at 653.
624. 852 F.2d 540 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
625. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988).
626. Martin J. Simko Constr., Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 540, 547-48 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(holding that Government's counterclaims pursuant to anti-fraud provision of CDA and False
Claims Act and Government's special plea in fraud did not require a contracting officer's final
decision as prerequisite to Claims Court's jurisdiction). Prior to enactment of the CDA, the
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of the FCA, the Court of Claims held that the Government had to
demonstrate that the contractor "present[ed]... for payment... any
claim upon or against the Govemment... knowing such claim to be
false."627 The FCA provides for a, statutory penalty of $5000 to
$10,000 for each violation, plus three times the amount of damages
sustained by the Government.62
In Young-Montenay, Inc. v. United States,6  the Federal Circuit held
that a contractor violated the FCA when submitting an inflated
supplier invoice.30 This constituted a violation of the FCA, even
though the contractor was eventually entitled to the inflated amount,
because the Government was damaged by the payment of funds to the
contractor before they were due"3 and by the loss of "financial
incentives to assure timely completion" of the project.6 2 The
Federal Circuit upheld the Court of Federal Claims' award to the
Government of larger-than-requested damages under the civil FCA,
while adopting a four-part test for the recovery of FCA damages.633
Young-Montenay entered into a contract with the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) for the renovation of boilers at a VA medical
center in Texas." During contract performance, Young-Montenay
placed an order for three sophisticated burners from a supplier and
the supplier issued an invoice to Young-Montenay for $104,000.635
Young-Montenay and the supplier subsequently disputed the price
and scope of the order covered by the invoice.63 6  The supplier
claimed an additional $49,000 for delivery of a complete "burner
package." 37 Prior to paying the supplier the additional funds,
Young-Montenay submitted a progress payment request to the
Government supported by an altered invoice from the supplier.6 18
Court of Claims also exercised jurisdiction over False Claims Act counterclaims in contractor
claim suits. See Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693, 703-04 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (noting that suits
against Government may be met with counterclaims in same jurisdictional forum for purposes
of convenience).
627. Miller v. United States, 550 F.2d 17, 22 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (emphasis in original) (finding
Government False Claims Act counterclaim sustained where contractor's careless billing
procedures resulted in overcharging to Government).
628. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
629. 15 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
630. Young-Montenay, Inc. v. United States, 15 F.3d 1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
631. IdX; see also i. at n.3.
632. Id. at n.3.
633. IX. at 1043; see infra note 648 and accompanying text (discussing application of test for
recovery of FCA damages).
634. Young-Montenay, 15 F.3d at 1041.
635. Id.
636. Itt
637. I&
638. I&
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Young-Montenay's project manager testified in a deposition that he
altered the original invoice by deleting $104,000 from the bill and
substituting $153,000.1 9 The supplier later issued an invoice to
Young-Montenay in the amount of $153,000 for the burner pack-
age.' Young-Montenay subsequently filed claims with the contract-
ing officer for alleged government-caused delays." 1 The contracting
officer denied the claim; and Young-Montenay appealed to the Court
of Federal Claims. 2  There, the Government asserted counter-
claims under the claim forfeiture statute' and the civil False Claim
Act against Young-Montenay for submission of the altered invoice.'
The Court of Federal Claims granted the Government's motion for
summary judgment on its counterclaims and awarded both treble
damages in the amount of $147,000 and a statutory penalty of
$5000,11 even though the Government had only asserted entitle-
ment to $98,000 in damages under the Act. 6 The court applied
a four-part test for recovery of damages under the FCA, as laid out in
United States ex rel. Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance. 1
7
The court reasoned that Young-Montenay "may have been entitled to
the money at a future date, but this did not give it license to submit
an altered invoice for payment." ' The Court of Federal Claims
rejected Young-Montenay's contention that the Government was
entitled only to the interest on the extra $49,000 for the time period
it was deprived of the use of the funds, 9 and awarded an amount
equal to three times the $49,000 extra payment, without explaining
why it awarded significantly more than the Government request-
ed.6 0
639. I. at 1042.
640. I. at 1041 n.l.
641. X at 1041.
642. Young-Montenay, Inc. v. United States, 39 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 76,642, at 89,069
(Fed. CI.Jan. 6, 1993).
643. 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1988).
644. Young-Montenay, 39 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH), at 89,069.
645. Id. at 89,071.
646. YoungMoneay, 15 F.3d at 1043.
647. 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989). This four-part test requires that: (1) a claim be
presented or caused to be presented to a government employee; (2) the claim was faise; (3) the
party presenting the claim knew the claim was false; and (4) the United States suffered damages.
Young-Montenay, 39 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 89,070 (citing United States ex re! Stinson v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla. 1989)). The court held
that the Government met its burden to prove a violation and receive treble damages. Young-
Montenay, 15 F.3d at 1040.
648. Young-Mont"ay, 39 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 89,071.
649. Id.
650. Id.
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The Federal Circuit adopted the Court of Federal Claims' four-part
test for the recovery of FCA damages, 1 and upheld the lower
court's decision, reasoning that it was "immaterial whether [the
project manager] believed Young-Montenay would subsequently owe
[the supplier] $153,000.00, for at the time of the submission of the
invoice to the government, he knew Young-Montenay then owed [the
supplier] only $104,000.00. " I2 The court further held that "the
government was damaged by paying money before it was due to the
contractor and that the trial court determined the proper amount of
damages, which it lawfully trebled."6.
Countering Young-Montenay's assertion that the Government was
only entitled to lost interest on the inflated claim, the court reasoned
that the Government was not only damaged by the lost use of the
money paid under the inflated invoice, but also by the loss of leverage
over the contractor to ensure timely and quality completion of the
project.6' In justifying the lower court's damage award, the Federal
Circuit noted that "[n]o authority has been cited to mandate
acceptance of the contractor's arguments for lesser measures" and
that three times the difference between the original and altered
invoice constituted a "reasonable measure of damages."1 5
Young-Montenay reached a predictable result given the blatant
admission of invoice alteration by the contractor's project manager.
The case is significant because it clearly spells out the elements of a
Government counterclaim for damages under the FCA, and espouses
the view that the court may award the maximum amount of damages
allowed under the FCA, even though the Government asks for less.
The other noteworthy aspect of Young-Montenay is the novel idea
advanced by the Federal Circuit that compensable damages under the
FCA need not be purely monetary in nature; the loss of financial
incentives over the contractor is sufficient to sustain damages. 5'
Thus, the Government may now be encouraged to bring spurious FCA
counterclaims based on legitimate contractor activities which result in
the loss of contract leverage, rather than fraudulent activities which
651. Young-Montenay, 15 F.3d at 1043. The Federal Circuit repeated the same four-part test
as the Court of Federal Claims, but cited as authority the Court of Claims' decision in Miller v.
United States, 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1977), rather than Slinson, the case cited by the Court of
Federal Claims. I.
652. 1& at 1042 (emphasis in original).
653. 1& at 1043.
654. l& at 1043 n.3.
655. I& at 1043.
656. I& at 1043 n.3.
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cause actual monetary loss to the Government." The Federal
Circuit obviously considered its pronouncements regarding the
governmental interest in maintaining financial incentives to ensure
timely contract completion important enough to reissue Young-
Montenay as a precedential opinion.65
E. Scope of Appellate Review
The CDA requires that the contracting officer's decisions be
reviewed de novo on appeal.659 The CDA also provides that the
contracting officer's findings of fact "shall not be binding in any
subsequent proceeding."660 Prior to enactment of the CDA, the
Court of Claims considered the contracting officer's findings that
favored the contractor to be admissions of government liability,
subject to rebuttal..6 1 Even after the CDA was enacted,662 both the
boards and the Court of Federal Claims continued to apply this
presumption and utilize contracting officer's findings in reaching
their decisions. 3
In Wilner v. United States,6  the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that the CDA's de novo review requirement prohibits the use of
unrebutted contracting officer's findings of facts as evidentiary
admissions of government liability.6" Wilner's contract with the
Navy to construct a training facility at Camp Pendleton, California was
657. Cf Sterling Millwrights, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 49, 99 (1992) (dismissing
Government FCA counterclaims based on legitimate contractor actions to maximize profits on
fixed-price construction contract).
658. See Trial Court Can Give Government LargerJudgment Against Contractor Than It Requested -
Decision Made Precedentia& 36 GOVERNMENT CoNTRACTOR 1 200 (Apr. 6, 1994) (summarizing
reissued opinion); Trial Court Can Give Government Larger Jugment Against Contractor Than It
Requested, 35 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR 1 734 (Dec. 1, 1993) (summarizing Federal Circuit's
initial opinion).
659. 41 U.S.C. § 609(3) (1988).
660. Id. § 605(a); see also Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(holding that contracting officer's decision is entitled to no special deference on appeal).
661. SeeJ.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235,245 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (stating that
"the findings of the contracting officer have been said to constitute a strong presumption ...
or an evidentiary admission ... of the extent of the Government's liability, but always subject
to rebuttal") (citations omitted). Note, however, that Hedin was subsequently overruled. See
infra note 667 and accompanying text.
662. Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 2, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at 41 U.S.C. 601 (1988)).
663. See, eg., Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(barring contractor's claim based on intent of parties); Timberland Paving & Constr. Co. v.
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 129,141 (1989) (discussing contractor officer's determination); Charles
G. Williams Constr., Inc., ASBCA No. 33766, 89-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 21,733, at 109,249 (1989)
(evaluating, but dismissing, contracting officer's claims).
664. 24 F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
665. SeeWilnerv. United States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1402-03 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (overruling Hedin by
holding that plain language of CDA shall not make contracting officer's findings, in later
proceedings, evidence of Government's liability).
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delayed by 447 days.' Subsequently, Wilner submitted a claim to
the contracting officer alleging that the Government was responsible
for the entire delay period.667 The contracting officer found that
Wilner was entitled to only 260 days of compensable delay plus a net
award of $17,259.66  Wilner then appealed the decision to the
Claims Court, alleging that the Government was responsible for the
entire 447 days of delay. 69
After a bench trial, the Claims Court determined that the evidence
presented by Wilner only established that ninety-one days of govern-
ment-caused delay were on the "critical path" °67  of the project
schedule.67 ' Nevertheless, the court awarded Wilner 259 days of
delay after hearing the contracting officer's testimony on behalf of the
Government .explaining the process used to arrive at the final
decision, as well as the decision itself.72 The Claims Court, citing
JD. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States,673 concluded that the
findings of the contracting officer were "entitled to a strong presump-
tion of validity, subject to rebuttal." 74 The Claims Court considered
the contracting officer's decision as "evidence before the court that
must be considered and weighed."67' Recognizing that the Govern-
ment did not rebut the contracting officer's findings, the Claims
Court relied on both the contracting officer's formal determinations
of critical path delays and the contracting officer's testimony that his
conclusions were based on the technical analysis of his staff.67
The Government appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the
Court of Federal Claims failed to conduct a proper de novo review
under the CDA.67 7 After a divided panel affirmed the lower court's
666. It. at 1398.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1398.
670. See NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 50, at 116 (defining Critical Path Method). Critical
Path Method (CPM) "represents the longest chain of interrelated activities in the project
schedule diagram." Id. "[A] delay in completing an item on this critical path delays the entire
project." Id. CPM "has become an accepted means of substantiating delay [claims) before the
courts and boards of contract appeals." Id.
671. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1399.
672. Wilner, 26 Cl. Ct. at 280-81.
673. 347 F.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
674. Winer, 26 Cl. Ct. at 277.
675. Id.
676. Id. at 279-80. The court stated that "[t]he problem that the court perceives is that its
determinations thus far reflect the government-caused delays as proved by plaintiff at trial,
rather than what the court perceives, but plaintiff failed to prove, to be the actual government-
caused delays." I. at 277.
677. Wilner v. United States, 994 F.2d 783, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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decision in May 1993,678 the Government filed a petition for rehear-
ing en banc67 9 In August 1993, the Federal Circuit granted the
petition for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel decision, and
withdrew the panel opinion.a 0
On rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims
Court's decision, concluding the de novo review requirement of the
CDA demands that "once an action is brought following a contracting
officer's decision, the parties start in court or before the board with
a clean slate. " "sa The Court's decision turned on its conclusion that
Congress, in enacting the CDA, prohibited the use of favorable
contracting officer findings as evidentiary admissions. 2 Relying on
both the plain language of the CDA!S" and its decision in Assurance
Co. v. United States,' the Court concluded that there is no defer-
ence to the contracting officer's decision under de novo review.Y
In other words, the contracting officer's decision is not presumed
correct."a Under the facts of this case, the Federal Circuit noted
that the Claims Court's award to Wilner was based solely on the fact
that the contracting officer made an award to Wilner, not because
evidence at trial supported Wilner's claim.'a7 The Federal Circuit
added that the Claims Court used the contracting officer's decision
to trump other evidence at trial and thus "allow[ed] [the contractor]
to escape the consequences of his failure to meet his burden of
proof."'
In his dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Bennett! 9 argued vigorously
that enactment of the CDA did not overrule the holding ofJD. Hedin
Construction.6' The dissent thoroughly examined the legislative
678. I at 788-89 (holding that Claims Court did not conduct proper de novo review of
contracting officer's decision).
679. i at 792.
680. Xri
681. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1402.
682. 1I at 1402-03.
683. 41 U.S.C. §§ 605(a), 609(a)(3) (1988) (proving that "[sipecific findings of fact [by
contracting officer] ... shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding" and that any action
"shall proceed de novo").
684. 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that CDA "itself suggests that, where an
appeal is taken to a board or court, the contracting officer's award is not to be treated as if it
were the unappealed determination of a lower tribunal which is owed special deference or
acceptance on appeal").
685. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1401.
686. i
687. Id.
688. i at 1402.
689. judge Bennett authored the majority opinion in the panel decision, and was also the
trial commissioner forJ.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 171 Cl. Ct. 70,347 F.2d 235 (Fed.
Cir. 1965). Wdlner, 994 F.2d at 783; Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1408 n.7.
690. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1403-13 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
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history of the CDA and concluded that its enactment reaffirmed,
rather than overruled, J.D. Hedin Construction.69 The dissent argued
that if Congress intended to overrule JD. Hedin Construction by
enacting the de novo review requirement of the CDA, it would have
expressly stated its intent in the legislative history.692 In addition,
nothing in the CDA prohibits the use of the contracting officer's
findings and conclusions as evidence in a subsequent de novo
proceeding.69 In the dissent's view, the majority's literal interpreta-
tion of the de novo review requirement will "require[] relitigation of
every fact, including facts not disputed by the agency and previously
conceded," leading to increased expense for both contractors and the
Government, and waste ofjudicial resources. 694
Unfortunately, the "common sense" approach exhibited by the
Court in Transamerica Insurance Corp. v. United States9 ' and Arnold M.
Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton69 did not prevail in Wilner Construction. The
Federal Circuit abandoned the "common sense" approach and
"change[d] the law to place additional, if not impossible, burdens on
contractors in resolving disputes with agencies." 6' The elimination
of the presumptive validity rule will significantly increase contractors'
litigation expenses and provide greater leverage for the Government
to settle claims before they reach litigation. The ultimate impact of
Wilner Construction depends on how it is used by the Government in
future disputes. This decision may allow the Government to force
inequitable settlements on contractors at the administrative level, but
it may also liberate contracting officers to make more findings in
favor of contractors. What is certain, however, is that Wilner Construc-
691. Id at 1407-11 (BennettJ., dissenting).
692. Id at 1409 (Bennett, J., dissenting). For example, the dissent pointed out that the
legislative history of the CDA does not mention JD. Hedin Consir., while it does discuss and
criticize United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424 (1966), and United States v. Utah
Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), which limited the circumstances under which the
Court of Claims could conduct de novo hearings. I. The dissent also pointed out that these
cases "have been recognized as overruled." Id.
693. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1410. The dissent also argued that "[t]he mere fact that the
contracting officer's decision is nonbinding on appeal to the Claims Court does not mean that
it has no evidentiary value." Id. at 1404. The dissent further stated that "when factual findings
are not contradicted on the appeal, they can be given probative weight without requiring the
contractor to reprove the facts." It.
694. IdL at 1403 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
695. Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572,1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying
common sense analysis to interpretation of CDA requirement); see also supra notes 519-22 and
accompanying text (discussing further court's treatment of Transamerica's "common sense"
approach).
696. Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton, 25 F.3d 1006, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1994); seesupra notes
517-49 and accompanying text (discussing Diamondand corresponding effect of"common sense"
approach on subsequent jurisprudence).
697. Wilner, 24 F.3d at 1403 (BennettJ, dissenting).
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tion will lead to more, if not necessarily fairer, settlements at the
contracting agency level.
E Timeliness of Appeal from Contracting Officer's Final Decision
As discussed above, the CDA contains two separate limitations
periods for contractor appeals from adverse contracting officer
decisions.698 The CDA proscribes a ninety-day statute of limitations
for appeals from contracting officer's decisions to the boards of
contract appeals,6 while providing for a one-year limitation period
for appeals to the United States Court of Federal Claims.700 These
provisions create a jurisdictional anomaly which may present a
procedural snare to unwary contractors.
In West Coast General Corp. v. Dalton,°1 the Federal Circuit held
that the ninety-day period for appeal of a contracting officer's
decision to a board of contract appeals is not tolled by the disposition
of a claim under the same contract in the Court of Federal
Claims." 2 The Federal Circuit reasoned that a Court of Federal
Claims decision "directed to one claim brought by a party does not
create binding precedent for a separate claim-even a separate claim
from the same party" under the same contract.
703
West Coast received a construction contract from the Navy and
encountered a differing site condition during performance that
required relocation of a gas line."° West Coast subsequently sub-
mitted a claim for extra costs relating to the gas line relocation in
October 1988.705 Previously, in 1987, West Coast had filed a claim
with the Navy under the same contract for extra road paving
costs. 71 West Coast submitted both claims to the Navy's Resident
Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC). The Navy denied the
698. See supra notes 557-63 and accompanying text (describing CDA's contractor appeal
procedures and limitation periods).
699. 41 U.S.C, § 606 (1988).
700. It. § 609(a) (3). Prior to enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.), contractor
CDA claims were subject to no formal limitation period for presentation to the contracting
officer. See Board of Governors v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 27, 30 n.3 (1986) (stating that CDA
provides no limitations period for presentation of claims to contracting officer, CDA limitations
periods govern exclusion of general six-year statute of limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2501).
The FASA institutes a six-year limitations period for the presentation of claims for all contracts.
Pub. L. No. 103-355, §§ 2302, 2351, 102 Stat. 3243, 3321-22 (1994) (codified in scattered sections
of 10 U.S.C.).
701. 39 F.3d 312 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
702. West Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
703. IM/
704. Id/ at 313.
705. IX at 313-14.
706. 1& at 314.
2195
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2115
paving claim in 1987 and West Coast appealed to the Claims
Court.7  The Navy also denied the gas line claim in April 1989 by
a written decision of the contracting officer that properly informed
West Coast of its appeal rights, as well as the time-periods for
appeal. 71a  West Coast allowed the ninety-day period for appeal of
the April 1989 final decision to the ASBCA to run.7°  During the
ninety-day period, West Coast did not ask the Navy to reconsider the
decision. 7"0 Nor was there any evidence that the Navy itself took any
action to reconsider the decision during this period. 1
In the Claims Court, the Government moved to dismiss West
Coast's paving claim for lack ofjurisdiction, arguing that because the
claim was submitted to the ROICC it did not satisfy the CDA's
requirement that a claim "be submitted to the contracting offi-
cer."712  The Court agreed with the Government and issued a
decision in December 1989, dismissing West Coast's paving claim for
failure to properly submit the claim to the contracting officer.13
After the Claims Court decision, West Coast informed the Navy that
the decision also invalidated the gas line claim because it was also
submitted to the ROICC rather than to the contracting officer.1 4
The Navy subsequently entered into discussions with West Coast
regarding both claims, and indicated that if attempts at settlement
were not successful, West Coast would have to resubmit its gas line
claim to the contracting officer.715  The settlement negotiations
were unsuccessful, and in June 1990, West Coast resubmitted the gas
line claim to the contracting officer for a decision.7 16 The contract-
ing officer responded that the April 1989 gas line decision issued was
not invalidated by the Claims Court's decision in West Coast land thus
the decision remained in effect.71 As a result, the contracting
officer would not render a decision on West Coast's June 1990
resubmission.718
707. Id.
708. M4
709. Id.
710. Id.
711. West Coast Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 44294, 93-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 26,242, at 130,551-52
(1993) (West Coast 11).
712. Id. at 130,552.
713. West Coast Gen. Corp. v. United States, 19 CI. Ct. 98, 101 (1989) (West Coast 1). The
1994 Federal Circuit case affirmed the ASBCA decision.
714. West Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 314 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
715. Id.
716. Id.
717. Id.
718. IM.
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In March 1992, West Coast appealed its June 1990 gas line claim to
the ASBCA on a "deemed denial" basis.719 The ASBCA granted the
Government's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely due to the
Board's view that the ninety-day filing period could not be waived
because "the decision met the requirements of the CDA, and there
was no reconsideration [by the contracting officer] during the appeal
period."7 2' The Board, citing the Federal Circuit's 1991 decision in
Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States,72 believed the gas line claim
was properly "'submitted to the contracting officer for a decision'
even though it was sent to the ROICC. 722  The ASBCA rejected
West Coast's argument that "the Claims Court decision invalidated the
26 April 1989 gas line decision and revived its gas line claim" for three
reasons. 72 ' First, the "paving and gas line claims obviously were
separate and distinct claims."724 Second, "the [] paving decision was
issued nearly two years before [the] gas line decision."7' Third, the
"claims [were not] consolidated before the appeal period expired on
the gas line claim."726
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit upheld the ASBCA's
decision.727  The majority found Claims Court decisions to consti-
tute only persuasive authority.78 Thus, a decision directed to a
particular party's claim is not binding for a separate claim, even a
separate claim brought by the same party.7 The court held that
West Coast "had no legal basis for its reliance on West Coast I' in
foregoing an appeal of the contracting officer's gas line decision
because the paving and gas line claims were distinct and separate
claims, and "the trial court's refusal to take jurisdiction in West Coast
Iwas incorrect."73
719. Id. If the contracting officer fails to render a decision within sixty days, the claim is
deemed denied and the CDA enables the contractor to lodge an appeal in the appropriate
forum. See NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 50, at 122.
720. West Coast Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 44294, 93-3 B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,242, at 130,552
(1993).
721. 930 F.2d 872, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting Government's argument that contractor
must address or deliver claim directly to contracting officer and holding contractor's submission
to ROICC representative was valid). The Federal Circuit's decision in Dawco Construction
.overruled the reasoning and result in West Coast L" West Coast Genera4 39 F.3d at 314.
722. West Coast Genera4 93-3 B.C.A. (CCH) at 130,552.
723. Id
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. Id.
728. Id.
729. West Coast Gen. Corp. v. United States, 39 F.3d 312, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
730. I.
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The dissent argued that West Coast was entitled to rely on the
Court of Federal Claims decision in West Coast Igiven the circumstanc-
es of the case, and that the effect of the majority opinion was an
improper retroactive application of Dawco Construction.7"' In the
dissent's view, "West Coast's actions were reasonable and served to
advance resolution of the merits of the claim.""3 2 The dissent also
argued that affirming the Board would only encourage parties to
ignore Court of Federal Claims decisions.7"" The dissent applied
the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson7" to deter-
mine whether the retroactive application of Dawco Construction was
proper and concluded that both the ASBCA's and majority's decisions
were "contrary to the principles... ofjustice."735
The implications of West Coast General will not be as dire as those
predicted by the dissent. The majority opinion reaffirms the statutory
underpinnings, of the CDA filing periods and warns contractor's to
protect diligently their rights of appeal for each claim without regard
to the disposition of other claims under the same contract. The
majority reached a result that was both predictable and essentially
correct. To have held otherwise would have allowed the contractor
to proceed with a CDA claim at the Board almost two years after it
unilaterally decided to let the ninety-day statutory filing period expire.
Indeed, the majority and the dissent overlook the essential premise
of the Board's decision: West Coast's appeal was untimely because
the ninety-day filing period expired six months in advance of the
Claims Court decision in West Coast I. When examined from this
perspective, whether or not the contractor was entitled to rely on the
subsequent court decision is irrelevant. West Coast reemphasizes that
the jurisdictional requirements of the CDA rest on a contractor claim
and a contracting officer's decision on that claim, and reiterates that
claims under the same contract are separate and distinct unless
731. Id. at 317-18 (NewmanJ., dissenting).
732. I. (NewmanJ., dissenting).
733. Id. at 317 (Newman, J., dissenting).
734. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (explaining that decision should apply retroactively if
decision establishes new principles of law, does not produce inequitable results, and does not
retard rule's operation).
735. West Coast Genera 39 F.3d at 318 (Newman,J., dissenting). The dissent's contention
that the Board applied Dawco Construction retroactively is mistaken. Rather than applying Dawco
retroactively, the ASBCA may have been implicitly exercising its discretion to render decisions
independent of the Court of Federal Claims. Decisions of the Court of Federal Claims are not
binding on the Boards of Contract Appeals. See Tomahawk Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 41717, 93-3
B.CA. (CCH) 1 26,219 (1993); Roy McGinnis & Co., ASBCA Nos. 40004, 40005, 91-1 B.CA
(CCH) 1 23,395 (1990). Had West Coast appealed to the ASBCA after West Coast I, but prior
to Dawco, the Board would not have been bound by the Court of Federal Claim's decision in
West Coast I and could have reached the same result.
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affirmatively consolidated. Thus, West Coast Ceneralwarns contractors
and contractor's counsel to take every available precaution to preserve
claim appeal rights, no matter what promises of settlement are made
by the Government.
CONCLUSION
None of the Federal Circuit's 1994 government contracts decisions
was, individually, a landmark decision. None will likely find its way
into a casebook or be recognized as a seminal decision in years to
come. The court's 1994 docket stands in striking contrast to its
anticipated docket for 1995, when the Federal Circuit is expected to
issue at least two significant rulings that will make, and perhaps
shatter, precedent.7" 6
Like a vintage of wine that is good but not great, an appellate
court's work in a modestly good year may be overshadowed by an
adjacent year in which truly significant decisions were issued. Even
though the Federal Circuit may not have changed the fundamental
course of government contracts law during 1994, practitioners and
scholars should applaud the court's work. The decisions discussed in
this Article generally make valuable contributions to the law of
Government contracts by breaking new ground in some cases and by
refining long-standing legal principles in other cases.
The authors of this Article hope that they also detect a slightly
greater interest on the part of the Federal Circuit during 1994 in
deciding cases on the merits, rather than on increasingly fine points
of jurisdiction and procedure. The former, not the latter, is what
leads parties to hire lawyers and file protests, claims, and lawsuits to
begin with. Tribunals that resolve Government contracts disputes owe
it to the litigants, as well as to the legal process, to render decisions
on substantive, rather than procedural, grounds whenever possible.
736. As of the date of this Article, en banc appeals were pending before the Federal Circuit
in Reflectone Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 34 F.3d 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and Winstar Corp.
v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Ref/ectone poses the question whether the
amount of a contractor's demand for payment must be "in dispute" before the demand will be
considered a "claim" for purposes ofjurisdiction under the CDA. Implicit in the court's en banc
consideration of Refle.one's appeal is the question whether the Federal Circuit will overturn its
controversial ruling in Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872 (Fed..Cir. 1991),
less than four years after the Federal Circuit decided that case. Winstar poses the question
whether the Government will be held liable for breaching its contracts with savings and loan
investors because Congress subsequently changed the law with respect to the accounting
treatment of their investments. Winstar presents the fundamental tension between requiting
the Government to honor its word just like any other contracting party, on the one hand, and
recognizing the right of Congress to legislate in the public interest, on the other hand.
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